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*Small Business*

*AKOJ.*

I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: see "TO" DISTRIBUTION  
cc: see "CC" DISTRIBUTION

DATE: WED 26 JUN 1985 1:42 PM EDT  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5277218506

SUBJECT: SMALL BUSINESS AND DEPARTMENTAL COMPUTING

I do not want to consider any organizational changes until we get the product strategy organized for Small Business and Departmental Computing.

I do not want to make an investment in developing a product line, setting it up, proving it, and incurring all of the investments and all of the costs, and then not be able to make money because we are competing with our OEM's who do not incur these costs.

Before we accept a plan for formal organization, I want to be assured that we will have separate products from our OEM's and that we will not compete against them. If we cannot figure out how, I would say let's drop Small Business forever.

We can sell a simplified All-in-1 system with skunk box and MicroVAX for our direct group, and traditional packaging with ll's and A-Z for our OEM's, and end up with products that are different and not competitive. However, I want to be assured that we have the discipline not to immediately sell to OEM's anything we develop for direct sales and lose our investment.

I would like to be assured that we have a simple, rational set of products that our customer can understand, our Sales people can understand, and our marketers can understand; that will cover Small Business, Office, and Departmental Computing. For example, we could sell the same machine with the same software, on a server, and on Ethernet, but with no hook to Ethernet, the same hardware and software would be a Small Business, standalone computer.

I would like to be assured that we have a minimum hardware and software staff, and we have a financial model that makes money with expenses incurred.

The engineering probably should be in a product group with a business plan that takes care of Departmental Computing and business computing, and all industry groups would sell this product along with the Stores Channel Group.

K04:S10.49  
(DICTATED 6/26/85 BUT NOT READ)

"TO" DISTRIBUTION:

JAY ATLAS  
JACK MACKEEEN

PETER CONKLIN  
OLLIE STONE

GERRY HORNIK  
JIM WILLIS

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\*WIN HINDLE  
JOHN SIMS

JIM OSTERHOFF  
JACK SMITH

JACK SHIELDS

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*Small Business* *K.O.*

I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: see "TO" DISTRIBUTION  
cc: see "CC" DISTRIBUTION

DATE: THU 27 JUN 1985 10:25 AM EDT  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5277319309

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS/DEPARTMENT COMPUTING AND OFFICE

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Before we commit to any plans for Small Business, for Departmental Computing, and for Office, I'd like to make some key decisions.

The first key decision is:

1. I want our products to in no way compete with those products we sell to OEMs.
2. I want to be sure that the Office software used is optimum for the application. There is severe criticism of All-In-1. It is much too complicated for small business, probably too complicated for departmental computing, and many of the big company users are overwhelmed with the complexity, features, and details in the software. I'd like to raise and force the question immediately as to whether we should go with All-In-1, or should we use just A-Z for all our Office, Departmental, and Small Business applications. We can change the name of A-Z to All-In-1.

KHO:mt  
K04:SECT10.544  
DICTATED 6/27/85 BUT NOT READ

"TO" DISTRIBUTION:

HENRY ANCONA	JAY ATLAS	BOB DALEY
BILL HEFFNER	GERALD HORNIK	BOB HUGHES
JACK SMITH	OLLIE STONE	BILL STRECKER

"CC" DISTRIBUTION:

*WIN HINDLE	JIM OSTERHOFF	JACK SHIELDS
JOHN SIMS	RON SMART	

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2- Small Bus. *[Signature]*

I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: see "TO" DISTRIBUTION

DATE: FRI 31 MAY 1985 1:08 PM EDT  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5274600866

SUBJECT: SMALL BUSINESS

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We decided, sometime ago, and I believe I made a clear statement that Dealers are under COEM, and we will not grow any more Dealers and cut back when appropriate.

I would like to reiterate again that until we demonstrate that we can do the complete job with direct selling, with or without the Stores, we will not sell skunk boxes, with 11's or Micro VAXes, to OEM's or Dealers.

I have told Jay Atlas that the major goal for now is to prove that we can do a complete job and deliver a product that solves a problem when it is plugged in and satisfies the customers need. I do not want to talk about channels, or OEM's, or discounts, or history until we learn to deliver a product that is truly a product.

For years, we have talked about channels and so forth, and applications, and so forth, but so far we have not got around to making a product. We have spent many millions on applications, many millions on channels, but with no organization to ever get a product.

K04:S10.12  
(DICTATED 5/31/85 BUT NOT READ)

"TO" DISTRIBUTION:

\*WIN HINDLE  
JOHN SIMS

JIM OSTERHOFF  
RON SMART

JACK SHIELDS  
JACK SMITH

STRATEGY COMMITTEE:

MIS - Mkt. Mgr.

~~FB~~

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Keep  
9/21/89

I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: \*WIN HINDLE  
JACK SHIELDS  
JOHN SIMS  
JACK SMITH

DATE: THU 28 FEB 1985 11:51 AM EST  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5265418205

SUBJECT: MY GOALS FOR THE NEW MIS MARKETING GROUP

I would like to form an MIS Marketing Group. In this group I would like two new people: one who would be the world's best expert in marketing MIS to medium-sized companies, and the other to be the world's best expert in marketing large computers to large organizations.

I would like to cover the range of applications with just two computers:

1. A Micro-VAX that goes from one small disk to a Micro-VAX that has several RA82's.
2. Clustered VENUS computers, which should take care of the largest corporate needs.

I would like to transfer software in both areas only on MAYA tape.

I want to sell systems that give solutions. I don't want to sell components and I don't want to get into the position of having to match each of our components with component sellers. We will sell only complete systems and complete solutions, and our price will be matched to the good we do the customer, and not the sum of the physical components.

I want to do the whole job. One salesman will make one contract for all the hardware and software, the installation, the serial lines, and the terminals, (which include scales, data entry devices, security devices, workstations, cash registers, optical readers, etc.). Also included in the contract would be software support and training. The customer will not have to negotiate with several Digital groups.

By concentrating on just two systems, Micro-Vax and VENUS, and advertising them as one architecture in two computers, to cover the whole range of business, and, by selling large numbers of the same thing, I propose that we will get outside software houses to write specialized software for these machines the same way they do today for the IBM PC.

The user manuals will be worked on to the point where they are so good that customers will be willing to buy the systems immediately after reading the them.

The number of configurations will be very small. The Micro-VAX machine will not be suitable for OEM use, because it is not designed to be expandable or designed to take miscellaneous modules. For each configuration, each module is specifically assigned to a certain slot, and all testing, specifications and manuals are based on the exact configurations.

There are three systems for Micro-VAX. One has a single RD52 disk and a MAYA tape and that is called Model A. Model B has three RD53 disks and a MAYA tape, and Model C has five RA82's and a MAYA tape.

The many variables on a Micro-VAX business machine are: the amount of memory, which comes in one megabyte chunks, and the number of serial lines, which come in 24 or 32 line chunks. The only options are: ETHERNET connection and built-in modem.

In VENUS, the disks are connected either through HSC, or directly to the computer, but all peripherals are only tied in through ETHERNET and no serial lines are allowed directly on VENUS.

My goal is that the offering in this area be so simple that every employee, salesman, customer, and even every marketer and vice president, understand exactly what the offerings are and what the corresponding prices are. With the simplicity of the offering we can then expect marketers, salespeople and customers to understand the features that come with the VMS, and the quality of the UNIX that we offer.

KHO:m1  
KH4:S7.64

See Ken - M.C.  
1. Yes, this is Mgt. Com. staff  
2.

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I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O

TO: Win Hindle  
John Sims

Date: 4 December 1984  
From: Ken Olsen  
Dept: Administration  
MS: MLO10-2/A50 Ext: 223-2301

CC: Ron Smart

SUBJ: MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

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The Management Committee is not showing true aggressiveness to straighten out poor management practices. They seem to be very passive and only worry about things that affect them.

We should have a much smaller committee that is truly aggressive in straightening out management problems within the Corporation. This should not be an educational meeting, or one which represents all interests of the Corporation. The Management Committee's only motivation should be to improve the management of the Corporation. (1)

At the Management Committee meeting today, please introduce the problem of measurements. The one we have today was largely proposed by a small number of marketing groups, and their interests have been taken care of by the measurement system, but things like terminals and office products do not get measured at all. Please test the Committee to see how aggressive, interested, and useful they are in discussing this problem.

Also, at today's meeting, please review with the Management Committee, the two audits we have on the Conference Center and Lancaster, and the accounting within Barry Folsom's operation. Let's see how interested and useful they are in solving these problems. (2)

KHO:blk  
K04:S5.4  
DICTATED ON 12/3/84 BUT NOT READ

a related note is attached

copy

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: STRATEGY COMMITTEE:

DATE: MON 10 DEC 1984 1:27 PM EST

cc: \*RON SMART  
JACK SMITH

FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5257430835

SUBJECT: DECISION-MAKING AT DIGITAL

\*\*\*\*\*  
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Eighteen months ago, we decided that diskless workstations and PC's were very important. We have made no progress on the subject.

Soon, it will be two years that we started working on Digital 423 as a serial line system that would allow high-speeds and compatibility with each of the other standards, and would allow significant rejection of noise pick-up. It was studied for many months, a year ago, by a committee chaired by Sam Fuller, and it was approved by that committee. After that, it went round and round and round, and was finally approved by the Strategy Committee. Now, there are a thousand people who say, "I have not been convinced yet and I will do what I want."

We allow absolute anarchy as far as picking circuits, connectors, wire shielding and not shielding, speeds, but anyone, that is absolutely anyone, can stop a standard by simply saying, "I can't remember what the arguments for this were, or they never took my vote." No one needs to propose a workable system; they just have to say "no" to anyone who proposes a workable system.

For five years, I have proposed that we have a standard specification for power supplies on the low-end, and that we have a standard box for the low-end systems. No one dares face the thousands of people who would slaughter them if they proposed a standard, but absolute anarchy and many, many, many millions of dollars filling the whim of every designer does not bother anyone in the Finance group, or in Headquarters.

A year ago, we had a working model of an industry standard MS-DOS machine that cost \$600 to build. We were so sure that we had it, that I proposed and put on a major effort to have a first batch ready for last September to sell to the Harvard Business School students when they came back to school. A year later, we are farther and farther away from a small, simple, competitive machine than we were at that time. Everybody walking by can add to it; no one can say, "this is what we are going to build." Some product lines have full-time staff advising Engineering what



features have to be added to each product. No one would dare stand up to the thousands and say, "This is the machine we should build and here are the features we are leaving out."

Sometime ago, I decided I would withdraw from the discussions of the ~~PC25~~, because decisions might be made more quickly. Instead, the machine has become bigger and more expensive, with more features.

~~I would like to make this subject a major discussion at the December Strategy Committee WOODS meeting. I would like to have this discussion only with the Strategy Committee. I would like Jack Smith to ask his staff to study how this is done traditionally in other organizations in Western society. I would also like Jack Smith to propose, with this wisdom, how we should solve this problem.~~

How do we get simple, clear, competitive proposals approved, scheduled, budgeted, and staffed, without one person out of thousands, including Jack's own staff, stop it because they are not completely convinced.

I believe most organizations, when decisions are made by the senior committee of the Corporation, with departmental staff of the affected organization, would be sure that those decisions are carried out, the appropriate projects are scheduled, staffed, and budgeted, and jobs are completed and brought back to the committee for approval.

KHO:blk  
K04:S5.31

*John Sims (talk file) President General*  
Mgt. Com.

EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES AT DIGITAL - 1984

- OVERALL, EMPLOYEES REMAIN POSITIVE ABOUT THE COMPANY. THEY BELIEVE DIGITAL VALUES IT'S EMPLOYEES. WOULD RECOMMEND THE COMPANY TO A FRIEND.
- THERE ARE SOME SHORT TERM CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPANY, BUT EMPLOYEES EXPRESS CONFIDENCE IN THE PROSPECT OF LONG TERM SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY.
- DIGITAL PRODUCES HIGH QUALITY PRODUCTS AND IS WELL ON IT'S WAY TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SUCCESSFUL, INTEGRATED, OVERALL PRODUCT STRATEGY.
- EMPLOYEES RATE THEIR BENEFITS AS EXCELLENT AND THEIR COMPENSATION AS COMPETITIVE WITH A CLEAR CORRELATION BETWEEN PAY AND PERFORMANCE ON THE JOB.
- EMPLOYEES BELIEVE THEIR WORKING CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY GOOD, RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THEM, PARTICULARLY COMPUTER SYSTEMS, EXCELLENT, AND THERE IS ADEQUATE TRAINING AVAILABLE SO THAT THEY CAN FUNCTION PROPERLY ON THE JOB.
- EMPLOYEES INDICATE THAT JOB SECURITY IS NOT AN ISSUE AS LONG AS THEY ARE PERFORMING ADEQUATELY ON THE JOB.

- CONTINUED -

- PERSONNEL POLICIES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE AND THESE POLICIES ARE BEING MORE CONSISTENTLY APPLIED TODAY THEN PREVIOUSLY.
- COMPANY DOES NOT ADDRESS POOR PERFORMANCE IN A TIMELY MANNER, POOR PERFORMANCE IS TOLERATED TOO LONG. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO LONG SERVICE EMPLOYEES.
- EMPLOYEES FEAR CHANGE AND THE IMPACT THE CHANGE WILL HAVE ON THEM PERSONALLY. THEY BELIEVE CHANGES ARE NECESSARY IN MOST CASES, BUT THE PROCESS IS FRIGHTENING.
- WHO YOU KNOW IS BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT YOU KNOW WHEN SEEKING AN INTERNAL TRANSFER. THE BEST QUALIFIED PEOPLE DO NOT ALWAYS GET THE JOB.
- EMPLOYEES GENERALLY BELIEVE WE HAVE EXCESS PEOPLE AND IN MANY AREAS, THERE IS A POOR DISTRIBUTION OF WORK. SOME EMPLOYEES HAVE TOO MUCH WORK, OTHERS NOT ENOUGH.
- VERY LITTLE INCENTIVE FOR EMPLOYEES TO TAKE "RISKS". WHY SHOULD I? NO ONE ELSE DOES.
- THERE IS INCREASED RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF EMPLOYEES TO USE THE "OPEN DOOR" PROCESS TO ADDRESS ISSUES BECAUSE OF THE FEAR OF REPRISAL. EMPLOYEES WOULD ONLY USE THIS PROCESS AS A LAST RESORT.

- CONTINUED -

- MANAGEMENT ABILITY IS NOT VALUED AT DIGITAL. MANAGERS ARE GENERALLY HIGH LEVEL INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTORS WHO ARE REWARDED ON THE "DELIVERABLES" AND NOT FOR MANAGING.
- ORIENTATION FOR NEW EMPLOYEES IS POOR. AS A RESULT, NEW EMPLOYEES TAKE LONGER THAN THEY SHOULD TO BECOME PRODUCTIVE.
- EMPLOYEES ARE FRUSTRATED AT TIMES BECAUSE THERE IS NOT A CLEAR PROCESS IN PLACE TO MAKE DECISIONS. AS A RESULT, EMPLOYEES BELIEVE OBTAINING TIMELY DECISIONS IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.
- EMPLOYEES WANT MORE COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPANY OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY MORE INFORMATION AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

Mgt. Com.  
~~2/18~~

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: MANAGEMENT COMM:  
cc: see "CC" DISTRIBUTION

DATE: FRI 14 DEC 1984 2:06 PM EST  
FROM: RON SMART  
DEPT: MC SECRETARY  
EXT: 223-7011  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-1/F41

MESSAGE ID: 5257836925

SUBJECT: STRAW DESCRIPTION "MC ROLE IN HOW THE COMPANY WORKS"

This material is background for the 12/18/84 Management Committee discussion on the "Role of the Management Committee".

The concepts are a distillation of the original New DIGITAL thinking, of what Ken and other senior managers have said (or meant to), of the many discussions about Committees, and finally of the most recent discussions within and among the Corporate Committee Secretariates.

(See diagram at end for Function and Committee relationships)

COMMITTEE ROLES  
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Many committee charter discussions have tended towards making charter statements which are too inclusive. We tried to list the FEW things which each Committee MUST accomplish to help the company to succeed.

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

- \* Transform the management capability of the company, from what it is to what will accomplish our business, market, quality, people etc. goals. Do this by reviewing and upgrading management development, quality, planning/budgeting/reviewing & program management systems.
- \* Approve (actually done by a sub-committee) the operating plans and budgets which accomplish our aggressive financial/market goals. Do this by deciding the final BOD recommendations and by deciding the performance improving/correcting adjustments which cannot be resolved directly within and between Functions and at lower levels.
- \* Approve and review performance against corporate budgets, plans and standards. Approve recommendations to BOD of high financial impact business proposals and commitments.

STRATEGY COMMITTEE

- \* Approve the Corporate Product and Market targeting and strategy. In doing this, the Market Group Manager members provide the necessary liaison with the Field Functions via MSSC.
- \* Set the corporate goals for Product and Market segment penetration

(growth) rate versus profitability balance. Revise these goals when the profit versus growth investment of the aggregated corporate portfolio will not support this set of product and market plans.

- \* Review and recommended changes to Product and Market segment plans and market messages which are important to accomplishing our goals.

#### MARKETING AND SALES STRATEGY COMMITTEE (including PAC sub-committee)

- \* Review and approve Marketing and Sales implementation programs which are to accomplish the corporate Product and Market goals. To do this, the MSSC agenda includes geographic performance reviews of SALES & SERVICE PRODUCTIVITY by Market and Product segment.
- \* Decides the pricing, terms and introduction plans for all products and services, in order to achieve the corporate Product and Market segment goals (set by the Strategy Committee).

#### MANUFACTURING/ENGINEERING STAFF COMMITTEE (S/C feeder & admin channel)

- \* Integrates the Component and System product investment strategies to accomplish the Market and Product targeting goals set by S/C.
- \* Prepare recommendations and alternative product solutions for the Strategy Committee deliberations. Administer the implementation of the product strategy and product schedule and performance goals.

#### FIELD/MANUFACTURING "TUESDAY" MEETING

- \* Set, review and revise the Product Volume plans which make up the Corporate and Area revenue plans and budgets. Beyond the current year, Marketing intelligence is introduced into the decisions from both Product Management (Engineering) and Market Groups.

#### MANAGEMENT CONTROL REQUIREMENTS


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Management control systems will assist managers:

- \* To plan, budget, review & correct departmental programs to improve Functional performance in Corporate Product and Market segments. To be able to do this bottoms-up by Product/Market segment, while the system maintains integrity BETWEEN the related Functional programs supporting each of our Corporate Product and Market segment goals. This is contrary to the expedient of budgeting Functions top-down, and then dividing the Functional pie among their programs/projects.
- \* Relate corporate goals to departmental goals, such that any changes of risk/opportunity at the departmental level, can easily be translated into their effects on Corporate goals performance.
- \* Provide Program and Project control which is explicit about results and milestones along the way, as well as about resource investment, and managers' responsibilities for performance issue resolution.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY IN GOAL SETTING

Managers at all levels are evaluated on performance against their goals. Managers participate in setting their goals. Managers are responsible for making their goals consistent with the Corporate goals, which means that any apparent goal conflict with others is resolved as part of the manager's job of business-issue resolution.



✓ June Woods

COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL - FOR OPERATIONS COMMITTEE ONLY

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I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE  
CC: Ron Smart

Date: 20 May 1982  
From: Ken Olsen  
Dept: Administration  
MS: ML10-2/A50 Ext: 2301

SUBJ: June Woods - Review of Sacred Cow

I have been very discouraged at the number of times the Operations Committee members have used as an excuse for non-management, the rumor that their people heard, or thought they heard, or imagined, that Ken Olsen, or someone else, considered something a sacred cow.

Either I am going to have to leave, or the Operations Committee members are going to have to leave, if we use as an excuse for non-management, rumors or the imagining of sacred cows. A good manager will always raise a question when something is done less than perfectly, unwisely or stupidly, because someone thinks someone may think that they may want it one way or another.

There are more and more people in the company who I will not have anything to do with, because they work so hard to figure out what I really mean rather than what I said. My only solution is to not talk with them.

Early in the life of the CT project, I continually asked for a budget and a plan. People so enjoyed having the power of a sacred cow that most of the project was done without an approved plan or an approved budget, and there was nothing I could do to get one.

I would like to spend the whole June Woods Meeting reviewing and approving or disapproving sacred cows. I would like Ron Smart to get from every member of the Operations Committee a list of every sacred cow he thinks he is hiding, saving, avoiding or not influencing the good management of, no matter who the sacred cow seems to belong to.

I would like to include all sacred cows, whether they be Engineering projects, products now being manufactured, product lines, marketing activity, reports, buildings or anything else.

In particular, I would like to review the 278. I never heard of a 15 million dollar budget. No one ever asked me about it, no one ever told me what was in it. I am sure it is not a sacred cow of mine. I would like to know what Engineering would really like to do in place of that product and I would like to hear all proposals for saving money by eliminating projects.



Managers and committees have to make decisions. People do not always get their point of view. Sometimes people have several points of view and are apt to lose on all but one of them. We can not afford to have managers, responsible for projects who feel, after they lose their point of view or many of their different points of view on an item, that they then have an excuse for not managing it, because it is someones sacred cow.

If Operations Committee members can not handle these so called sacred cows, I think we should take at least those issues if not all their responsibility away from them and give it to someone else.

If we have enough time, I would like to also consider golden calves. Golden calves are an example of idolatry. Idolatry is something you have blind faith in and do not like to criticize. Engineering projects and Marketing are both idolatries within the Operations Committee.

I no longer want to increase engineering expenses and marketing expenses because we have blind faith that these are the way to heaven. I would like to analyze each one to make sure they contribute to the company.

KHO:cc  
K01:S11.41

~~Robert~~ ~~Cherry~~ Gen. Woods

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

FROM: RON SMART

DATE: JUNE 15, 1982

RE: SACRED COWS ET AL

There are three classes of items which could benefit from some committee time to ensure that concerns which O/C members feel are of importance to the Company do get examined adequately in an appropriate forum.

The classes of items in order of decreasing tangibility are:

1. Items (services) we spend money on but perhaps not wisely as situations change. Al Bertocchi has the most comprehensive list of these. You may want to add to the list (attached) then prioritize and assign responsibility to examine the item and recommend its disposition.
2. Product investments with uncertain payoffs because of inadequate marketing, poor management of the project, or suboptimum products.

Examples of possible candidates:

- o Things we think we have to do forever, eg. machine specific applications development on older architectures 12-bit, 16-bit ?
- o Jupiter, Venus, Nautilus - redundant developments?
- o Things we want to make rather than buy (we think we own computing and can do it all better than anyone else).

Jack Smith's product investment/payoff study should get at this if we can follow all the way through to changing the investment mix.

3. A general class of behavior issues characterized in committees by:
  - o Product Line Managers won't bring up contentious items in front of Ken.
  - o You don't bother me, and I won't bother you. Keep quiet rather than irritate. Public agreement but private dissent.

Some myths and misinterpretations:

- o Freedom to propose means authority to execute
- o Freedom to be creative means sub-optimization and entitlements.
- o O/C members are good at communicating downwards.

Things I can do to get at this last kind of issue and at philosophical/strategy issues:

1. Keep open most of the "short items" time on the agenda, specifically for airing nagging or unclear items which seem important to members; getting these items clarified and prioritized.
2. Maintain a formal list of important open items and unfinished business. See that their prioritization and disposition is visible.
3. We also need to clarify committee responsibilities and structure between O/C, PLMM, PPC . . . Bill Thompson and I have the responsibility to propose Product Review BODs. By and large, the New Digital will lead us to rethink the committee structure and role.

SACRED COWS

1. Eliminate Christmas turkey give-away. If some tangible token is still in order, give each employee a "symbolic turkey," i.e., a check for fifteen dollars.
2. Eliminate or curtail the Canobie Lake outings (and equivalents elsewhere).
3. Move payroll to biweekly (monthly for WC4) (questionable benefit).
4. Stop Tobin's coffee/donuts delivery service.
5. Eliminate 5-year anniversary luncheons; retain 10- and 20-year recognition.
6. Clean roof lines policy (the added cost we incur by building decks, pads, etc., for mechanical equipment that would normally go on the roof).
7. Periodically open the cafeteria and vending franchises to competition in the greater Maynard area.
8. Sharply curtail the early salary reviews.
9. Stop multiple moves/relocations of the one group.
10. Cut back helicopter and shuttle service.      *AVIATION?*
11. Use internal mail for items to be mailed to employees' home.
12. Permitting ever expanding proliferation of small (dollars and headcount) centers.
13. Overly liberal tuition refund -- irrespective of relevance to Digital's needs.
14. *EMS : is it used effectively, cost effective, SECURITY?*

June Woods

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* d i g i t a l \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE:

DATE: FRI 11 JUN 1982 3:23 PM EDT  
FROM: WIN HINDLE  
DEPT: CORPORATE OPERATIONS  
EXT: 223-2338  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A53

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION (RESPONSE TO KEN'S JUNE 4 MEMO)

The weaknesses of the current organization that I would like to cure in any organization change are:

1. Marketing people must have a measure we all agree upon. Those who do well should be rewarded well in compensation and promotions.
2. Our organization structure should allow us to add up a specified set of groups to arrive at the corporate NOR and profit. It should be easy to see who is making plan and who is not.
3. Our marketing organization structure and measurements should eliminate internal hassles over credit for Bookings and NOR.

Plans for the company should be set in several ways.

1. All countries and districts should budget NOR for their area, which should total the Corporate NOR. Countries and districts should be measured on NOR and on "Distribution Profit" - a measure we still need to define.
2. Base Product Marketing Groups should plan NOR, which should also total the Corporate NOR. These Groups should be measured on NOR and on "Product Profit" - a measure we still need to define. Also they should be measured on ROA.
3. Applications Marketing, Channel Marketing, and Industry Marketing should propose plans, but these will not equal Corporate NOR. These three kinds of groups should be measured on total "Systems NOR" and total profit generated as a result of their marketing efforts.

WH1:S.1.9

Hang-ups - Reward good mktg.

- Keep a clean focus on profit (broken into pieces)

- Let local managers set plans & optimize corp.

June Woods

JUN 7 1982

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I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Date: 4 JUNE 1982

cc: Ron Smart

From: Ken Olsen

Dept: Administration

MS: ML10-2/A50

Ext: 2301

SUBJ: ORGANIZATIONAL DISCUSSION FOR WOODS MEETING

①

I would like each one of you to prepare two things for the organizational discussion. First, I would like a list of those hang-ups you have or weaknesses you see in the organization, that you would like straightened out when we change the organization.

②

Then I would like a simple statement as to how you think we should collect plans for the budgets and who should be responsible for them.



Here is the format for a simple chart that demonstrates how the numbers of the Company add up.

If we assume there will be 50 Districts (Subsidiaries and combinations of small countries), and 10 products (groupings of products), and 20 Product Lines (marketing/business units), there will be 10,000 intersections or numbers.

If each District orders, or reports, or processes, by product and by Product Line, they will each present 10 times 20, or 200 numbers, (50 Districts makes 10,000 pieces of information).

This would then be recast for each Product Line and each chart will show product by District, or 10 times 50, or 500 numbers.

For each product, the chart will show District by Product Line or 20 times 50, for 1,000 numbers.

The Corporate summary would be in 3 charts:

- a) District by product (for all Product Lines) - 50 times 10, or 500 numbers
- b) District by Product Line for all products which would be 50 times 20, or 1,000 numbers.
- c) Product Line by product for each District, or 20 times 10, or 200 numbers.

These three charts present all of the intersections for the Corporation. How we extract the numbers and use them to manage the Company is one of the major questions. We may have to summarize some of the numbers to make it manageable but we do not want to demotivate the people who are grouped.

My hang-ups and desires for an organization, breakdown into four pieces.

- 1) I do not want each District or Subsidiary to have eighteen Product Lines and many people within each Product Line telling them in detail what to do. I would like them to have the freedom to run their business in an optimum way, to develop strategy and optimize their facilities and people. I do not want to overwhelm them with reporting and accounting. I want to educate them to use data processing and model making to optimize their own organization and not send massive amounts of data back to eighteen Product Lines and infinite numbers of organizations within the Company. Each of them should think they are optimizing the District.
- 2) I would like the District or Subsidiary to say what products, what markets, and what applications they will sell. I do not want this dumped on them by the Product Lines or the Operations Committee. If a product is poor or the marketing is poor, I want to find out immediately because the District will not want to sell it.
- 3) I like the idea that someone suggested that we do our basic marketing only once, probably in Engineering, that way it is not reproduced in a half-hearted way in every Product Line so the Product Lines then have little resources to do the specialized marketing for their market.
- 4) I feel we have to avoid all the negotiations, lawyers and accountants involved in sorting out who gets credit for each order. We may want to keep track of orders by Channel and by application, to learn the effectiveness of our investments but, we should not argue about sales that are not a result of these activities. If it is a serious question, we should allocate the credit twice or not at all. Above all, we should not go through the enormous amount of cost involved in allocating and setting up boundaries between Product Lines, which leave vast gaps that we do not cover at all as a Company. We want to see results of marketing, not how much falls within arbitrary boundaries.

I have come to believe that most business people believe in free trade and freedom to let the market make decisions. However, it is obvious that even though most of them personally want freedom from government, and or, from their immediate supervisors and freedom from all the regulators within their company and within the government, when you listen to them and watch them operate, it becomes clear that most of them, will give no freedom to optimize, improve or show judgement and strategy to those who work for them, or to those who supply them, or to those who sell for them.

I believe that if things are layed out right, individual managers and doers will optimized their tasks and do what is best for the Company. The system will automatically force the incompetent ones to disappear. If part of a Product Line's strategy is to assign so much for selling, and if the marketing and the documentation is done well, and if the product is good, the sales groups will enthusiastically and effectively sell this product.

There seems to be a natural inclination by all except the very best Product Lines, to be sure that the system will force the sales groups to sell their products whether they believe in them or not and to avoid the test of whether the Product Lines are effective marketers and planners. When sales goals are imposed on the sales group and it is a failure, the blame can then be placed on the sales group.

We should use the same computer and the same software in each District and in each of the other activities, and we should use them for collecting and distributing information. We should keep the information to a bare minimum. However, we should give them the knowledge and the details to use the computer in a uniform, consistent way to manage their own operations. This management data does not have to be passed on to the Corporation.

Jack Smith and Gordon Bell have contracted with two professors from the Tuck School to build a model of the engineering process and then use it to teach our managers how engineering works. They appear to be doing a magnificent job. May be we should contract with them to build a model of whatever we decide to run this part of the company, and have them teach our District Managers, Product Line Managers, and Product Managers, how the system works.

KHO:cc

KO1:S11.67



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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

WOODS

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

DATE: April 22, 1982  
FROM: Ed Schein

SUBJ: MY NOTES FROM APRIL WOODS

Sorry I had to leave early from a most interesting discussion on people. I think it is very important that you have these reviews and that you do it fairly often since you have very many people to go through.

I do think you should only do about two hours worth of this kind of people reviewing because attention span begins to wane after that, but if you did at least two hours worth at each WOODS Meeting that would provide you a pretty good overview.

I also want to underline that in thinking about future careers, you keep open the options that some of your people really want to become general managers (and have the potential), some of them want to become senior functional managers, and some of them want to be high level individual contributors. Keep the options open for each of these groups.

#### Comment on DEC Product

As you know I have been listening to the low end discussions since last summer, and it is getting clearer to me that you believe that you have the best product set, but that it is not easy to state in simple non-technical terms why they are the best. The fact that your secretaries also believe they are the best is not really helpful to someone who encounters a choice and wants to know why. I would propose the following questions to you for your "marketing training":

1. Would it be to your advantage to learn how to talk about the low end products in a vocabulary that a "dumb" user would understand?
2. Would it set a good example to your marketing people if you could talk in user, customer terms and be able to tell the layman exactly what is the advantage of DEC products over others, and one DEC product over another. If you can't do it, why should others in the company be able to do it. If you have good marketing people who can do it, why not have them come in and train you. I would be happy to be a dumb consumer panel anytime you want to try out a communications pitch on me. But so far I am still very confused and only know that you are convinced. I do not know the reasons why you think your products are so great.

#### Comment on Individual Accountability

Every form of organizing has advantages and disadvantages. The

pinpointing of accountability in individuals has the obvious advantage of making it clear who is to do what, inducing high levels of motivation, making it easy to measure, etc. Don't forget the major disadvantage -- individual accountability induces individual competitiveness.

If the product lines are pretty much independent in how they operate this is a great way to organize. But the higher the inter-dependence among product lines the more risk there is of product line managers who should be pulling together and helping each other becoming competitive and destructive. Especially if many managers are fighting for scarce resources, be very careful not to set up a situation where in order for one to succeed he makes another fail (wittingly or unwittingly).

mr

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: STRATEGY COMMITTEE:

DATE: THU 3 JAN 1985 9:40 AM EST  
FROM: JIM CUDMORE  
DEPT: PRODUCT OPERATIONS  
EXT: 223-6923  
LOC/MAIL STOP: MLO1-5/U33

cc: STRATCOM INTEREST:

MESSAGE ID: 5259852553

SUBJECT: STRATEGY COMMITTEE 12/19-20/84 WOODS MINUTES

\*\*\* COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL \*\*\*

--- DRAFT ---

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\* NOTE: THIS ENTIRE DOCUMENT SHOULD BE TREATED AS HIGHLY SENSITIVE \*  
\* AND RESTRICTED TO "NEED TO KNOW" DISTRIBUTION \*  
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MEMBERS: Jim Cudmore, Bill Demmer, Sam Fuller, Bob Glorioso,  
Bill Heffner, Bob Huettner, Bob Hughes, Bill Johnson,  
Jeff Kalb, Ed Kramer, Ward MacKenzie, Ken Olsen,  
Grant Saviers, Peter Smith, Jack Smith, Bill Strecker

*C - Please tell  
Eli Lipson of this  
discussion and actions  
at the Dec. 20. WOODS.  
He should get a copy from  
Ward MacKenzie -*

Other Attendees:

George Chamberlain, Peter Conklin, Dom LaCava,  
Ken Senior, Ron Smart.

OEM, End User discussion, Ward MacKenzie, Grant Saviers and Bill Demmer - general agreement on the need to clarify the true costs/benefits from our OEM channel and its impact/interaction with end-user business. Storage market share on our CPU's (chips, boards, kernel systems) through OEM channel much too low. Low-end storage volume (all channels) too low to justify continued investment without significant volume increase.

Action Items: Ward MacKenzie to prepare detailed analysis of boards business; Grant Saviers to evaluate alternatives for increasing our storage volume (at system level especially) and to review storage only OEM status and opportunities at future Strategy Committee meetings (Jan/Feb).

Orion (Unibus) Status, Dom LaCava - FRS is two quarters late and revenue, ROA are forecasted significantly lower than plan.

Action Item: Dom LaCava/Ward MacKenzie to review latest field forecast and propose to MSSC (in January) pricing, bundling or expense action to significantly improve financial performance (product is already shipping).

Microvax II Pricing Philosophy, Jesse Lipcon, presented the analysis of various price/volume elasticity relationships from the market groups and recommended a specific base system price.

Action items: Jesse Lipcon, Dom LaCava, Ward MacKenzie to work with MSSC to get proposed base price (plus a bit) understood and accepted; revenue, unit, profit models for OEM channel and end user markets to be shown separately; next six months investments (expense, inventory) to be detailed; outline by customer and application where/how unit volume splits; "board" revenue, profit and volume to be shown separately; pricing/bundling alternatives to be explored - single user VMS license pricing for work stations/multi user for team, packaged WPS system of MVII, PC's (memo response on above to Strategy Committee by 1/15/85; proposal for WPS system to be presented to Strat Comm 1/28/85). Ken Senior to present to Strategy Committee the field plan for selling the planned volumes (after MSSC approval).

Mayflower/Aurora/Scorpio Product Positioning - Bill Demmer - presented the relationship of these products in price, performance, timing and impact on BI Strategy; considerable discussion on the multiplicity and potential overlapping of these systems.

Action Items: Bill Demmer to present to Strategy Committee Jan 7 the impact on mid-range VAX's of dropping Aurora completely or offering a Scorpio in the Aurora package; at Jan 28th Strategy Committee review the business plan in detail showing board/business portion, pedestal package investment, investment and consequence of changes since original plan (BI clusters, volumes etc).

PC25 Strategy/Status - Jeff Kalb, Barry Folsom - reviewed the PC25 product status, marketing demand, and business plans, and Jeff proposed redirecting/refocusing the effort in two directions, two products 1) PCXX (MS/DOS) bounded/desk-top unit as part of a multi-user system for office and small business and 2) PC32, a VAX/VMS technical professional user system as part of a distributed computing environment. Henry Ancona stressed the need to address (1) our position on IBM PC as part of our systems, (2) the plans for the expected next level of human interface beyond MS/DOS (Topview, MS windows etc), and (3) the need for multi-tasking capability (?)

Action item: Jeff Kalb to present next level of plans for PCXX, PC32 at Strategy Committee Woods Jan. 16-17 1985.

December 20th

MEMBERS: Jim Cudmore, Bill Demmer, Sam Fuller, Bob Glorioso, Bill Heffner, Bob Huettner, Bob Hughes, Bill Johnson, Jeff Kalb, Ed Kramer, Ward MacKenzie, Ken Olsen,

~~Woods~~ WOODS

~~Jim Cudmore~~

Grant Saviers, Peter Smith, Jack Smith, Bill Strecker

Other Attendees:

George Chamberlain, Rose Ann Giordano, Win Hindle,  
John Sims, Ron Smart

- Frenetic Management - Ken Olsen - described this as management in a permanent state of frenzy with no time to plan, execute, follow-up, learn, thoroughly evaluate results of too many efforts with resources too thin to do any one thing well, and puts the company at great risk. Strong agreement on the need to significantly sharpen business focus on a products dimension (with different company business models) and significantly clarify the product industry and applications marketing roles/responsibilities between Eng., Mkt'g and Field.

Action Items: Jack Smith, Win Hindle to investigate with Jack Shields the ease of establishing specific product (systems) plans, revenue and expense commitments/measures; George Chamberlain to spell out the specific changes necessary to "run" the business by products; Jim Cudmore to chair a task-force of Ken Senior, Ken Swanton, Jerry Paxton, Ron Smart to structure the product/application/industry marketing questions and models to guide a discussion at Strategy Committee. *when?*

- Swat Teams Update - Rose Ann Giordano (IBM), Steve Teicher (Apollo), Jack Gilmore (Wang), John O'Keefe (Small Business) - status reports delivered, and clear direction given to presenters to return for major review on January 28th with specific steps necessary to make real progress.
- Communication Sub-System Task Force - Bill Picott - status presented and specific recommendations expected on January 28th.

COPIES OF ALL VIEWGRAPHS USED AVAILABLE IN THE FILE.

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CLEM MESSAGE ID: 5259862424



~~OCT 23 1981~~  
WOODS

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management  
50 Memorial Drive  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Edgar H. Schein  
Sloan Fellows Professor of Management  
Chairman, Organization Studies Group

Telephone: (617) 253-3636  
Telex No.: 921473MITCAM  
Cable: MITCAM

TO: Operations Committee  
FROM: Ed Schein  
SUBJECT: October Woods Meeting  
DATE: October 21, 1981

I had a few thoughts during the October Woods which I wanted to share with you. They might be labelled "what I have learned during these meetings."

1. Members of the Operations Committee have always had to wear two hats:
  - 1) Functional or Product Line Manager, and 2) Member of the corporation's top strategy and management group. As agenda items come up which require difficult resource allocation issues or choices between strategic options one can see the role conflict between the two roles very clearly.

The scenario which I have often seen develop in these situations is that it is very difficult to say "no" to a proposal because it implies saying "no" to too many people. There is no face-saving rational process for the group to meet its responsibility as corporate managers to allocate the resources of the company in a sound way and to involve others in owning the decision, even if it means not doing certain things.

2. When the group becomes silent, paralyzed, and tempted to run away from the problem, what is needed is managerial leadership. Someone must come forward with a broad solution and help the group to reach some kind of a decision, even if the decision is to table the issue until more information is available. But the act of tabling must be done positively and with clear reasons and with a clear plan for how to get the information and resolve the issue.

One of the most difficult managerial skills is to move a group toward resolution of an issue where scarce financial, human, or other resources have to be allocated among various projects. But running away from the issue, lobbying outside the group, power games behind the scenes, and other tactics which imply that the manager is wearing his hat no. 1 end up being destructive in the long run.

3. Difficult strategy questions pertaining to products, markets, and organization do not have enough time on the agenda given the size of the group and the complexity of the issues.

4. Visitors, outside presenters, and guests inhibit discussion. If outsiders are needed to present information, then the agenda should include some time for discussion of the issue after the outsiders are gone. Having them present "waiting for a decision" puts the group into a tough situation in which real feelings may not come out because members don't want to be stereotyped or labelled as "bad guys" or whatever.
5. If an agenda item takes too long, the group loses coherence, members wander off to start side conversations, and in other ways signal that they are not any longer involved. When that happens the issue needs to be restated in a way that reinvolves everyone. On the other hand, the group should impose more discipline on itself to remain involved or else someone should propose that the item is not important enough to be on the agenda.
6. New items for which people are not prepared are dangerous to put onto the agenda unless there is enough time to work them. Supposedly "quick" items invariably have hidden elements which blow up into major issues, e.g. what should advertising copy on TV look like. If such items have to be brought up because of time deadlines, be prepared to give them an hour or so, but don't rush into hasty decisions simply for lack of time.
7. Issues of finance, control, organization, and inter-product competition are not new. The enclosed memos were written by me during Woods Meetings in the late 1960's. Are they still relevant today?
8. The discussions of new products, especially the low end, make me wonder whether the "deep" problem is that these products require a different engineering, sales, marketing, and maybe even manufacturing philosophy, a set of values and skills which are not highly developed within DEC and which might make many people uncomfortable.

For example, the idea that the selling of these products might require more discipline, more reliance on checklists, more intensive sales training (McDonald's style), more customer concern, more of a "commodity" selling orientation might go against some deeply held DEC assumptions and values. Just a thought, but there is now a growing body of thought that suggests that the real and important constraints on strategy are the cultural elements in the organization, elements which are often subconscious and just taken for granted.

The DEC "culture" has interested me for some time and I am willing to talk about it at some Woods Meeting in the future.

9. The enclosed paper on Face-to-face skills seems very relevant to me in the DEC context. Following Ken's line that managers need to learn simple, traditional managerial skills, I would add that managers also need to learn the face-to-face skills which permit them to implement the formal management procedures without turning people off.

10. Finally, on the matter of management training, could we find out what the content was of the supervisory training program which was run for years (and probably still is running). I feel out of touch with what is currently being taught in the different parts of the company. Can this be pulled together and examined by the Operations Committee as a step toward designing the kind of management training which Ken has in mind?

It has been my observation over the years that parts of DEC are doing things which other parts don't know about. Maybe it is time to pull things together more and bring the O.C. up-to-date. Then we can find out at what level and in which parts of the company the management training is missing or misdirected.



JAN 15 1982

*Woods*

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I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O

TO: Operations Committee

Date: 15 January 1982  
From: Ken Olsen  
Dept: Administration  
MS: ML10-2/A50 Ext: 2301

SUBJ: Ken Olsen's Offhand Message to the Engineering Management  
Committee - January 15, 1982

I have a new concept of Corporate management. I don't know the name for it yet, but I think it will make a radical change in the way we operate the Company.

I think it's easier to explain it than it is to give it a name. Simply, it is: engineers will engineer, marketers will market, sales people will sell, and manufacturing will manufacture.

Digital got to where it is by working out goals for everyone and measuring them often and regularly. We've lost this with the development of matrix management where everybody is boss and no one has goals, and no one is measured. This new radical way of managing allows us to measure everyone again.

Engineers will be measured, every day of every year, on how well they have all the products necessary in their area to take care of the customer's needs at competitive prices, and with the flair to make them sell.

Note: He will not be measured by the beautiful graphs they make showing how things will be in the future. They will not be measured by the thickness of their reports, or the details of their budgets, nor will they be measured by the complex methods they have of working out conflicts between groups three or four years from now. They will be measured at each period of time by the quality of the products, and the need that they have at that particular time. All these other things are helps, to be sure that at every point of measurement, we have the right products.

There will not be any of the usual excuses. We can't blame it on marketing because they didn't see the need for products; we can't blame it on marketing because they said something wouldn't sell, or wasn't needed. We can't blame it on manufacturing because the products they didn't manufacture, and it's clear whose responsibility it is.

We will also avoid the problem we have in Engineering in the last few years. Very often, Engineering is working on a product way off in the future, and when we ask for a product immediately, they say, we didn't know you wanted one NOW, and that will cost you extra. All the money we invest in Engineering is for the future, and products need extra money, and that is to be allocated by the Operations Committee.

If we don't have the disks we need or if the Japanese competition has them, better or less expensive, it's clear whose responsibility it is. If we have 11/23's packaged and assembled like they were fifteen years ago, and we have to charge \$30,000 for them, and that it's possible to charge \$15,000 by eliminating FA&T, and if instead, we only have the promise of better machines way off in the future, it's clear whose responsibility it is.

When people now say, RLO2's are too big, and it hurts their professional pride, that may sound like a good reason for not doing things, but if at any one period of time, someone else does better with RLO2's because that's what people in business want, it's very clear that our Engineering made a mistake by not putting our RLO2's on our computers.

When we avoid using fiber optics for inter-connection between disks and pieces of computers, Engineering might be right in saying that the way we did it twenty-five years ago is still best. However, if the Japanese walk away with our market by having all of the glamour and ease and simplification of fiber optics, it's clear who made the mistake, and it can't be blamed on marketing.

People ask what do we do when people fail to use measurements. I say, don't worry about it at all. First of all, people practically never fail. When there are measurements that are first of all clear to the team doing the work, secondly to their peers, and thirdly to their boss, they make sure they never fail. When they do, it's so clear to everybody why, and it's so clear to them what they did wrong, and it's so clear that they thoroughly learned what was wrong, that the boss doesn't really have to do anything.

KHO/ep  
K01:S8.51

# Why Do Some People Outperform Others? Psychologist Picks Out Six Characteristics

By ERIK LARSON

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

BERKELEY, Calif.—There are big differences between individuals who outperform their colleagues and those who don't—differences a Berkeley performance psychologist has boiled down to a six-characteristic profile.

High-performers "are a different group in terms of skills, how they work, how they manage their stress, their risks," says Charles A. Garfield, president of the Peak Performance Center in Berkeley and a clinical professor at the University of California at San Francisco medical school. "They are different folks."

Mr. Garfield, 37 years old, has spent about 15 years interviewing about 1,200 of the top performers in business, education, sports, health care and the arts. He has found that chief executives who are considered top performers set their goals, solve their problems and take their risks using very different techniques than those used by less effective executives. What is more, he says, these techniques can be taught "in the same way you can teach people to play golf," although he concedes he couldn't completely transform a poor performer into a top performer.

## Interviews Questioned

An achiever himself, Mr. Garfield holds doctorates in mathematics and psychology. In 1964, he lifted weights at trials for the U.S. Olympic team; in 1967, as a mathematician and computer analyst, he helped design the first lunar module and plot its course to the moon. During his three years with the Apollo mission, he interviewed its top engineers and technicians. "I wanted to know how the pieces came together for such high performance," he says. He has held seminars on peak performance for corporations such as International Business Machines Corp., Tandem Computers Corp. and Hewlett-Packard Co. and he has a contract to produce a book on the subject later this year.

Research into peak performance isn't unique to Mr. Garfield. There is a growing body of psychological study aimed at finding out why some individuals so far outperform others, a field the Soviets call "anthropo-maximology." Society isn't satisfied anymore with plain old success, says Thomas Tutko, a San Jose State University psychology professor who has studied high performance in sports. "Now millionaires are a dime a dozen," he says. "We're looking for people who go beyond that." Mr. Garfield's

work, he says, "is as legitimate as you'll find in the popular literature."

Nevertheless, some researchers question the scientific rigor of research based on interviews. For example, Richard M. Suinn, head of the psychology department of Colo-



Charles A. Garfield

rado State University, says he is cautious about drawing conclusions from interviews. In his work with Olympic athletes he prefers to rely on standardized tests rather than interviews. There is a risk, he says, that an interviewer can influence the outcome of an interview.

## Not Workaholics

"He's quite right. That 'experimenter variable' can exist," says Mr. Garfield. But, he says, he uses interviewers trained to exhibit as little bias as possible. Also, they ask questions designed to test a subject's earlier answers.

Six characteristics mark optimal performers, says Mr. Garfield: They are able to transcend their previous levels of accomplishment. They avoid the so-called comfort zone, that no-man's land where an employee feels too much at home. They do what they do for the art of it and are guided by compelling, internal goals. They solve problems rather than place blame. They confidently take risks after laying out the worst consequences beforehand, and they are able to rehearse coming actions or events mentally.

Mr. Garfield is careful to stress that optimal performers aren't workaholics and don't exhibit so-called Type A behavior patterns, identified as leading to heart disease. They take their vacations, know when to stop working, manage stress well and don't get bogged down in details. "They are masters of delegation," he says. The workaholic,

meanwhile, brags about never taking a vacation and wears his latest heart attack as a badge of honor.

Mr. Garfield says he was most surprised by the trait of mental rehearsal, now a popular concept in sports. Top chief executives imagined every facet and feeling of what would have to happen to make a presentation a success, practicing a kind of purposeful daydreaming. A less effective executive, he says, would prepare his facts and agendas but not his psyche. Mr. Garfield wouldn't disclose the name of any of the executives in his sample.

High-performing executives also worked out "catastrophic expectations reports" either in their minds or in writing before taking a major risk. They set out the worst that could possibly happen and decided whether they could live with that outcome, he says. If they could, they moved ahead confidently. Other executives didn't go through the process and when taking a risk tended to be hampered by a sense of impending doom.

High performers were also driven in their work by goals they set themselves. The best salesmen were good team players who met their sales quotas, but also worked to develop their skills. "Quotas didn't meet their sense of themselves as artists," he says. Less effective salesmen got their rewards primarily from meeting the company's requirements. "They didn't necessarily enjoy the process itself," he says.

These skills, and skills evident in the other traits, can be taught, Mr. Garfield maintains. For example, people can be shown how to write out their own worst-case reports. And, he says, they can be encouraged to "blue-sky," or imagine what it would be like to surpass their current limits. At his seminars, he teaches people to challenge limiting or absolute words like "never" or "always."

Colorado's Mr. Suinn argues that seminars can't accomplish the kind of behavior modification needed to make these techniques stick. But Mr. Garfield counters that whether the techniques are adopted or not depends on whether they are tried. To help ensure that they are, he breaks his audience into two-person teams that later serve to encourage each other's use of the techniques. Also, he says, he follows up his seminars with four one-day seminars over 12 months.

"What he has done is put (his research) in a framework that is quite practical and usable," says Herb Koch, West Coast marketing manager of Control Data Corp.'s seminar division.

WOODS - Thurs 9/22

I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

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TO: see "TO" DISTRIBUTION

cc: KEN OLSEN

DATE: TUE 13 SEP 1983 12:09 PM EDT  
FROM: WIN HINDLE  
DEPT: CORPORATE OPERATIONS  
EXT: 223-2338  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A53

MESSAGE ID: 5212076925

SUBJECT: DIVISIONS

Ken has asked me to organize a Task Force to make recommendations on forming divisions. His memo on this issue will be sent along to you later today with his ideas on how we should proceed. I am asking each of you to be members of that group. We will have three days of meetings, next Friday (Sept. 16) in Maynard (Little Brown House on Parker St.) and the following Thursday and Friday (Sept. 22 and 23) at Ken's camp at Heald Pond in Northern Maine.

If you cannot be at all three days of meetings, we would prefer to ask someone else. Please let me know right away. The continuity of the three days will be essential in coming to an agreement at the end.

WH:dc  
WH1:S5.5

"TO" DISTRIBUTION:

GEORGE CHAMBERLAIN  
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JACK SHIELDS  
KEN SWANTON

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: see "TO" DISTRIBUTION

DATE: TUE 13 SEP 1983 1:08 PM EDT

cc: KEN OLSEN

FROM: WIN HINDLE

DEPT: CORPORATE OPERATIONS

EXT: 223-2338

LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A53

MESSAGE ID: 5212077098

SUBJECT: DIVISIONS

Attached is a copy of Ken's memo on the above subject.

"TO" DISTRIBUTION:

GEORGE CHAMBERLAIN  
BILL HANSON  
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KEN SWANTON

ATTACHED: MEMO;125

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: WIN HINDLE

DATE: TUE 13 SEP 1983 12:37 PM EDT  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5212077020

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS DIVISIONS AT SEPTEMBER WOODS

Please pick a group of people to form a one-time committee to make recommendations on how we might form divisions. Pick approximately twelve people who represent the appropriate parts of the Company, and those who have been especially interested in divisions. It is not important that any particular people be there and so if it is inconvenient for someone, just pick someone else.

I would like the first meeting to be this coming Friday in the little brown house, and then the second meeting for Thursday and Friday, September 22 and 23, at Heald Pond, in Maine.

I am afraid that everyone has different views as to what forming divisions will mean. I am afraid that they all feel it will take care of all the problems and hang-ups they have had with the rest of the organization. When it has been proposed in the past, it seemed clear that those who wanted to form divisions felt that this way they could be left alone to run things the way they wanted without cooperation or coordination with anyone else in the Company and there would never be any need to cooperate or compromise.

On the other hand, Bruce Henderson in his book, "On Corporate Strategy", says that divisionalization is deadly to creativity and is only suitable when a company is in a stable business and no new activities and ideas are needed. He claims that corporate staff completely and utterly stifle all creativity, originality and boldness.

The difference between the dream people have in forming a division, and Henderson's observation of what happens in a division, is reason enough to get together for three days. Our original setting up of product lines was very close to being divisionalized and we did things very closely to the way Henderson suggests. We had a very simple accounting that was presented each month that showed how each "division" was doing. Even though the accounting was not absolutely fair, and people were responsible for things they had no control over, it was simple, quick, and everyone understood it.

The "division managers" were very economical, (and sometimes painfully so), because they saw how every penny fit into their budget. They were reasonably humble because they saw the results of every decision they made and the Company was exceedingly profitable and fast-growing. It

was easy for me to show strong leadership because everyone saw how things fit together and each one thought they had control over their own destiny.

Without Bruce Henderson's help, I knew that it was important to stay in constant contact, and so we met once a week at the Operations Committee meeting, and for two days once a month at the WOODS meetings. The policies, attitudes, ethics, goals and long range plans were continuously transmitted this way.

In time the financial reporting became exceedingly complicated in an attempt to be fair. People didn't understand what they had. They didn't understand how the financial results tied with the decisions they made, and what happened when someone who was in complete control disappeared and the staff tried to institute controls to develop economies.

The humility that came with seeing the results of your work disappeared and a number of "division managers" developed a confidence in their own management skills. Many of them became very critical of the management skills of all the other managers. The value of the Operations Committee meetings and the WOODS meetings deteriorated seriously because so many members thought that they were the only smart ones, and that they alone were responsible for the Company's success. As individuals, it became clearer and clearer to them that cooperating with the less competent people in the Company, (which often included all their peers), was a serious affront to their position in the world of management. The result was that the Operations Committee meetings became quite unpleasant, as people sat through meetings, but refused to interchange or cooperate with others.

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KHO:ml

K02:S12.39



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I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Date: 4 JUNE 1982

From: Ken Olsen

cc: Ron Smart

Dept: Administration

MS: ML10-2/A50

Ext: 2301

SUBJ: ORGANIZATIONAL DISCUSSION FOR WOODS MEETING

I would like each one of you to prepare two things for the organizational discussion. First, I would like a list of those hang-ups you have or weaknesses you see in the organization, that you would like straightened out when we change the organization. Then I would like a simple statement as to how you think we should collect plans for the budgets and who should be responsible for them.

Here is the format for a simple chart that demonstrates how the numbers of the Company add up.

If we assume there will be 50 Districts (Subsidiaries and combinations of small countries), and 10 products (groupings of products), and 20 Product Lines (marketing/business units), there will be 10,000 intersections or numbers.

If each District orders, or reports, or processes, by product and by Product Line, they will each present 10 times 20, or 200 numbers, (50 Districts makes 10,000 pieces of information).

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For each product, the chart will show District by Product Line or 20 times 50, for 1,000 numbers.

The Corporate summary would be in 3 charts:

- a) District by product (for all Product Lines) - 50 times 10, or 500 numbers
- b) District by Product Line for all products which would be 50 times 20, or 1,000 numbers.
- c) Product Line by product for each District, or 20 times 10, or 200 numbers.

These three charts present all of the intersections for the Corporation. How we extract the numbers and use them to manage the Company is one of the major questions. We may have to summarize some of the numbers to make it manageable but we do not want to demotivate the people who are grouped.

My hang-ups and desires for an organization, breakdown into four pieces.

- 1) I do not want each District or Subsidiary to have eighteen Product Lines and many people within each Product Line telling them in detail what to do. I would like them to have the freedom to run their business in an optimum way, to develop strategy and optimize their facilities and people. I do not want to overwhelm them with reporting and accounting. I want to educate them to use data processing and model making to optimize their own organization and not send massive amounts of data back to eighteen Product Lines and infinite numbers of organizations within the Company. Each of them should think they are optimizing the District.
- 2) I would like the District or Subsidiary to say what products, what markets, and what applications they will sell. I do not want this dumped on them by the Product Lines or the Operations Committee. If a product is poor or the marketing is poor, I want to find out immediately because the District will not want to sell it.
- 3) I like the idea that someone suggested that we do our basic marketing only once, probably in Engineering, that way it is not reproduced in a half-hearted way in every Product Line so the Product Lines then have little resources to do the specialized marketing for their market.
- 4) I feel we have to avoid all the negotiations, lawyers and accountants involved in sorting out who gets credit for each order. We may want to keep track of orders by Channel and by application, to learn the effectiveness of our investments but, we should not argue about sales that are not a result of these activities. If it is a serious question, we should allocate the credit twice or not at all. Above all, we should not go through the enormous amount of cost involved in allocating and setting up boundaries between Product Lines, which leave vast gaps that we do not cover at all as a Company. We want to see results of marketing, not how much falls within arbitrary boundaries.

I have come to believe that most business people believe in free trade and freedom to let the market make decisions. However, it is obvious that even though most of them personally want freedom from government, and or, from their immediate supervisors and freedom from all the regulators within their company and within the government, when you listen to them and watch them operate, it becomes clear that most of them, will give no freedom to optimize, improve or show judgement and strategy to those who work for them, or to those who supply them, or to those who sell for them.

I believe that if things are layed out right, individual managers and doers will optimized their tasks and do what is best for the Company. The system will automatically force the incompetent ones to disappear. If part of a Product Line's strategy is to assign so much for selling, and if the marketing and the documentation is done well, and if the product is good, the sales groups will enthusiastically and effectively sell this product.

There seems to be a natural inclination by all except the very best Product Lines, to be sure that the system will force the sales groups to sell their products whether they believe in them or not and to avoid the test of whether the Product Lines are effective marketers and planners. When sales goals are imposed on the sales group and it is a failure, the blame can then be placed on the sales group.

We should use the same computer and the same software in each District and in each of the other activities, and we should use them for collecting and distributing information. We should keep the information to a bare minimum. However, we should give them the knowledge and the details to use the computer in a uniform, consistent way to manage their own operations. This management data does not have to be passed on to the Corporation.

Jack Smith and Gordon Bell have contracted with two professors from the Tuck School to build a model of the engineering process and then use it to teach our managers how engineering works. They appear to be doing a magnificent job. May be we should contract with them to build a model of whatever we decide to run this part of the company, and have them teach our District Managers, Product Line Managers, and Product Managers, how the system works.

KHO:cc  
K01:S11.67

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: AL BERTOCCHI

DATE: FRI 15 JUL 1983 12:55 PM EDT  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5206082060

SUBJECT: COMPANY DIVISIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I am planning to have most of the Company reporting to six or so divisions. In these divisions, accounting will be done for the groups themselves and will be done locally. The only numbers necessary for the central finance department will be very small and will be mailed once a month or once a quarter. The accounting will be done for the sake of the division with a few of the by-product numbers available to the Corporation.

This is clear and I think it will orient our accounting and make it very useful; however, it can easily be misunderstood. The accounting is done, by and for, each division; however, it is clear they all should do their accounting on the same computer with the same software and all the accounts should be numbered the same way and all the reports should look the same.

They run their own show, and they do it for their own use, but they will be more closely watched by central finance than ever before. They are not working for central finance and they are not working to generate numbers for them, only to generate numbers for their own use plus a little extra for headquarters but there is going to be no prejudicing the numbers to make things look good. They will be audited more carefully than ever.

Everything they do will be for their own sake; however, everything they do will be an open book to the Corporation. I have asked Pete Smith to prepare a proposal for a division. He is motivated because he has the business potential and just does not have the resources allocated to accomplish the things he needs to do. I think he will do a good job and I think it is one place in which the division will work out very well. However, they do need help in this financial area. I think it would be a good idea if you would personally get involved and help Pete. I think this is the time when your personal leadership, in this area, would be most effective because the pattern we set in Pete's group will probably set the pattern for all future divisions.

KHO:ep  
K02:S10.52

SEP 13 1983

Friday WOODS  
9/16

d i g i t a l

I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O R A N D U M

TO: WIN HINDLE

DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1983  
FROM: PETER SMITH  
DEPT: CAEM  
EXT.: 231-5160  
LOC/MAIL STOP: MRO3-1/E8

SUBJECT: DIVISION PROPOSAL

The attached for your information is a proposal which I recently gave to Ken and I would like to discuss with you sometime soon.

Regards.

d i g i t a l

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

*Peter Smith*

TO: Ken Olsen

DATE: 11 August 1983  
FROM: Peter Smith  
DEPT: CAEM  
DTN : 231-5160  
LOC : MRO3-1/E8

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

SUBJ: Division Proposal

Background:

The recent realignment of our Product Group and Area responsibilities provided much-needed efficiencies in terms of geographic consolidation of our operational activities and strategic focus on our key markets. However, the process resulted in weakened linkages between marketing and field implementation and left a significant gap in our strategic investment decision process. Further, the realignment has not helped us address the deteriorating linkages between the product development and marketing functions.

Proposal:

It is now necessary to take the next step and, without sacrificing the operational efficiencies we've gained, rebuild these important linkages and drive our investment decision process. We propose a two-phased "divisionalization" approach in order to accomplish this and assure:

1. Strategic focus on investment allocation, with clear visibility of the return from that investment.
2. Quick response (both in a marketing and product availability sense) to market and competitive change.
3. Improved integration of market strategy with implementation programs.
4. The proper external image in our key market segments.

The CAEM group proposes to provide leadership in this divisionalization approach, as we believe that we offer an excellent testbed because:

All of the above factors - our need to justify strategic investment, quick product response requirements, CAD/CAM Center implementation plans and our image of market commitment

for our customers and partners - are clearly critical to our continued progress.

- . A unique mix of high business potential and proven Corporate track record and strategy exists in this marketplace.

Phase I:

The "Phase I CAEM Division" (Attachment A) provides a vertical cut of Digital (along CAEM market lines) which:

- . Can orchestrate all functional activity required to meet goals.
- . Is measured in the same terms as you are.

Phase I does not require CAEM line reporting of all functional organizations but does assume measurement modifications to assure strong partnership relationships with key Central Engineering and Sales/Service activities. Specifically:

1. Sales/Service

Establish a partnership relationship where we would share the same goal set and:

- . CAEM and the field would contract for hardware, software and service revenue. ?
- . Agree on support services to be provided by marketing and the field. ✓
- . Selling costs, although not contracted for, would be reported after the fact for business model comparison purposes.

2. Engineering:

Align the Distributed Systems and Workstations Central Engineering activity with CAEM, as these are the "most strategically important" to us because: ?

1. Integration of applications, in very large part through our distributed computing philosophy, is the cornerstone of the CAEM strategy, and ✓
2. A leadership workstation product strategy must be inherently linked to our network/LAN capability. ✓



CAEM would assume dual responsibility for:

- A. Building a much more effective alignment between the CAEM marketplace and the product direction of these groups.
  - B. Corporate Base Product Marketing for these groups. ?
3. Manufacturing:

Through CAEM base product marketing activity, build partnership relationships between Distributed Systems and Workstation Engineering and Manufacturing as a function of new product cost/functionality requirements. Retain the recently established Field-to-Manufacturing operational link.

4. Measurement:

Measure CAEM effectiveness on TWO dimensions:

1. CAEM market penetration (volume of business) and business model return, including product and implementation costs and asset utilization.
2. Distributed Systems and Workstations product market share and return. ?

Phase II:

The "Phase II CAEM Division" (Attachment B) assumes Phase I implementation by other Marketing Divisions (Attachment D suggests some potential Central Engineering alignments) and:

- . Directly organizes the Distributed Systems and Workstations Engineering and Manufacturing activity around one strategic business plan and one reporting structure.
- . Specializes the Field Sales and Services activity for the CAEM marketplace.
- . Establishes a clear contractual relationship with the Sales/Service organization, and
- . Assumes a stand-alone division measured as a separate entity:
  - By CAEM market volume and return which includes:
    - . Product costs established through transfer pricing mechanism (including Manufacturing and amortized Engineering costs) between the "Marketing Divisions".
    - . Direct marketing (application and base product) costs.
    - . Field costs as contractually agreed.

Advantages:

Advantages of the phased approach include:

1. Could be implemented immediately without another major organizational disruption.
2. Allows us to rebuild important linkages with the Sales organization.
3. Provides a good counterbalance between market parochial and Corporate cross-market product direction priorities.
4. Provides flexibility if we decide Phase II emphasis should be product focused (not my recommendation), rather than market focused.

Implementation Issues:

- . CAEM business plan proposal for Phase I and Phase II (in progress)
- . Goal realignment for Sales/Services for CAEM
- . Organization of true Workstation Engineering function.
- . Organizational development of Distributed Systems and Workstation Base Product Marketing function
- . Timing:
  - Other Marketing Divisions
  - Phase II
- . Financial reporting system
  - CAEM market direction
  - Product return direction


I would look forward to your feedback and to further discussions.

lm  
att.


ATTACHMENTS

- A. Phase I CAEM Division
- B. Phase II CAEM Division
- C. Phase I - Phase II
- D. Potential Marketing Divisions/Engineering Partners

PHASE I CAEM DIVISION



PHASE II CAEM DIVISION



Measurement:

- . CAEM Market Share
- . CAEM Return

Attachment C

CAEM DIVISION DEFINITION

<u>Function</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Current Situation</u>	<u>Phase I</u>	<u>Phase II</u>
Marketing	. CAEM Direction	Own	Own	Own
	. Base Product Marketing for:			
	. Dist. Systems	No	Own	Own
	. Workstations	Influence	Own	Own
-----				
Engineering	. CAEM Specific	Partnership	Own	Own
	. Distributed Systems	No	Partnership	Own ?
	. Workstations	Influence (VAXstation)	Partnership	Own ?
	. Corp. Research	No	Influence	Influence
-----				
Manufacturing	. New Product	No	Partnership	Own ?
	. Standard Product	No	No	Own for Dist. Systems & Worksta.
-----				
Sales	. CAEM Focus	No	Partnership	Partnership
-----				
Services	. SWS	Influence	Partnership	Contract
	. CSS	Influence	Influence	Contract
	. Ed Services	No	Partnership	Contract
	. Specialized CAD/CAM Centers	Partnership	Own	Own
-----				

Definitions:

- o Own: Manage the people and resources - have full discretionary control.
- o Contract: Agree annually on specific "intersection metrics", which become key measurement variables for both divisional and functional management. No direct control over people management or resource allocation within the function.
- o Influence: Work with function on an idea-exchange basis; however, the function retains total discretion.
- o Partnership: Essentially a combination of Contract and two-way Influence; i.e., there is a contract around quantitative metrics, but also joint problem-solving around key qualitative issues.
- o No: Essentially no linkage.

Attachment D

POTENTIAL MARKETING DIVISIONS/ENGINEERING PARTNERSHIPS

- CAEM
  - . Distributed Systems
  - . Workstations
- OEM
  - . Semiconductor Engineering
  - . PDP-11
- Large Sytems
  - . Large VAX/Clusters
- Technical Group
  - . Small-Medium VAX
- BOS
  - . Marcus Activity
  - . Human Engineering
  - . DECmate Development
- PCG
  - . Low-End Development
- Add-On Group
  - . Storage Systems





*Friday WOODS  
9/16*

Interoffice Memo

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TO: see "TO" DISTRIBUTION

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DEPT: CORPORATE OPERATIONS  
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LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A53

MESSAGE ID: 5212077098

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ED KRAMER  
JACK SHIELDS  
KEN SWANTON

*Jerry Butler*  
*Bruce Osterling*  
ATTACHED: MEMO;125

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K02:S12.39

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I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Date: 4 JUNE 1982

cc: Ron Smart

From: Ken Olsen

Dept: Administration

MS: ML10-2/A50

Ext: 2301

SUBJ: ORGANIZATIONAL DISCUSSION FOR WOODS MEETING

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- b) District by Product Line for all products which would be 50 times 20, or 1,000 numbers.
- c) Product Line by product for each District, or 20 times 10, or 200 numbers.

These three charts present all of the intersections for the Corporation. How we extract the numbers and use them to manage the Company is one of the major questions. We may have to summarize some of the numbers to make it manageable but we do not want to demotivate the people who are grouped.

My hang-ups and desires for an organization, breakdown into four pieces.

- 1) I do not want each District or Subsidiary to have eighteen Product Lines and many people within each Product Line telling them in detail what to do. I would like them to have the freedom to run their business in an optimum way, to develop strategy and optimize their facilities and people. I do not want to overwhelm them with reporting and accounting. I want to educate them to use data processing and model making to optimize their own organization and not send massive amounts of data back to eighteen Product Lines and infinite numbers of organizations within the Company. Each of them should think they are optimizing the District.
- 2) I would like the District or Subsidiary to say what products, what markets, and what applications they will sell. I do not want this dumped on them by the Product Lines or the Operations Committee. If a product is poor or the marketing is poor, I want to find out immediately because the District will not want to sell it.
- 3) I like the idea that someone suggested that we do our basic marketing only once, probably in Engineering, that way it is not reproduced in a half-hearted way in every Product Line so the Product Lines then have little resources to do the specialized marketing for their market.
- 4) I feel we have to avoid all the negotiations, lawyers and accountants involved in sorting out who gets credit for each order. We may want to keep track of orders by Channel and by application, to learn the effectiveness of our investments but, we should not argue about sales that are not a result of these activities. If it is a serious question, we should allocate the credit twice or not at all. Above all, we should not go through the enormous amount of cost involved in allocating and setting up boundaries between Product Lines, which leave vast gaps that we do not cover at all as a Company. We want to see results of marketing, not how much falls within arbitrary boundaries.

I have come to believe that most business people believe in free trade and freedom to let the market make decisions. However, it is obvious that even though most of them personally want freedom from government, and or, from their immediate supervisors and freedom from all the regulators within their company and within the government, when you listen to them and watch them operate, it becomes clear that most of them, will give no freedom to optimize, improve or show judgement and strategy to those who work for them, or to those who supply them, or to those who sell for them.

I believe that if things are layed out right, individual managers and doers will optimized their tasks and do what is best for the Company. The system will automatically force the incompetent ones to disappear. If part of a Product Line's strategy is to assign so much for selling, and if the marketing and the documentation is done well, and if the product is good, the sales groups will enthusiastically and effectively sell this product.

There seems to be a natural inclination by all except the very best Product Lines, to be sure that the system will force the sales groups to sell their products whether they believe in them or not and to avoid the test of whether the Product Lines are effective marketers and planners. When sales goals are imposed on the sales group and it is a failure, the blame can then be placed on the sales group.

We should use the same computer and the same software in each District and in each of the other activities, and we should use them for collecting and distributing information. We should keep the information to a bare minimum. However, we should give them the knowledge and the details to use the computer in a uniform, consistent way to manage their own operations. This management data does not have to be passed on to the Corporation.

Jack Smith and Gordon Bell have contracted with two professors from the Tuck School to build a model of the engineering process and then use it to teach our managers how engineering works. They appear to be doing a magnificent job. May be we should contract with them to build a model of whatever we decide to run this part of the company, and have them teach our District Managers, Product Line Managers, and Product Managers, how the system works.

KHO:cc  
K01:S11.67

Friday WOODS

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I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: PMC:

DATE: TUE 13 SEP 1983 11:58 AM EDT  
FROM: DICK FARRAHAR  
DEPT: MKTG/F&A PERSONNEL  
EXT: 251-1336  
LOC/MAIL STOP: CFO2-3/C21

MESSAGE ID: 5212077777

SUBJECT: DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL MANAGER

Could I have any inputs to this draft of Divisional Personnel Manager.

\*\*\*\* RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION \*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\* D R A F T \*\*\*\*

Role of Divisional Personnel Manager

- o Divisional Personnel Manager should understand and actively participate in the management of the total business that includes understanding products, channels, markets, P&L structure, competition etc.
- o Divisional Personnel Manager will provide the Corporation as a whole with periodic reports on the state of the business from a people and organizational perspective.
- o Divisional Personnel Manager will provide the division with a bridge to the rest of the Corporation on people and organizational issues through the Personnel function.
- o Divisional Personnel Manager will translate business directions and needs into a human resource plan, so that appropriate people and organizational needs will be planned and provided. This includes assuring that all Personnel activity will be provided for either directly or through the Site Personnel Organization.
- o Divisional Personnel Manager will provide consulting on individual and group issues.
- o The Divisional Personnel Manager will report to the Divisional V.P. and through the Personnel Management Committee.

Divisional Personnel Manager --- Level 15



13-SEP-83 17:28:07 S 05815 CLEM  
CLEM MESSAGE ID: 5212013734

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* d i g i t a l \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

*Divisions*

Copy: Ron Smart

*Woods Dec*  
*Woods*

TO: OPERATIONS COMMITTEE:

DATE: WED 1 DEC 1982 5:55 PM EDT  
FROM: JACK SHIELDS  
DEPT: FIELD OPERATIONS  
EXT: 276-9890  
LOC/MAIL STOP: OG01-2/R12

MESSAGE ID: 5183409922

SUBJECT: MARKETING IN THE NEW DIGITAL

I'd like to make a few observations about marketing in The New Digital. I'll start with the disclaimers that I may suffer from Miles' Law, and my comments are meant to be constructive.

We have a dilemma. We want better, higher quality marketing. We feel we spend too much for what we get. In order to get better focus on marketing, we needed to restructure. As we restructure, a power loss is perceived as Profit and Loss moves. In order to keep people motivated (to do good marketing) we have an inherent resistance to change. (We need to keep the old marketing groups intact). If we keep all the old marketing groups intact, we don't have funds to create new groups and exploit the growth opportunities in markets we can clearly identify. Therefore, the structure change didn't really get us anything. So why did we change anyway?

The results are clear. Confusion, frustration, and perceived power loss without compensating new opportunities. We need to break the cycle! We started in Maine, and Bob Hughes' new group clearly addresses a major growth opportunity. Andy's well on his way.

We've taken major steps in the rationalization of value-added and non-value-added resellers. We have great people, full of energy, working in areas where I question the payback. This is not meant to demean any group, but rather to make the observation that a smaller group of people might be able to provide our marketing needs in some of our more industry-oriented marketing areas while we could create new opportunities by the formation of new groups in both the industry-oriented and applications-oriented market segments. We have enormous needs and opportunities, and I fear we'll miss the chance if we don't break the cycle soon. This week we created an add-on product group, and we're generally receptive to the creation of an after-market product group (a \$1 billion opportunity and a number of big, important jobs).

We need an AI focus; we need a network focus; we need a banking focus; we need a telecommunication focus. We need factory applications, education applications, etc.

I fear that if we ask the field to input along the old market group lines, we'll just continue to reinforce what we have. I sense a fear to ask the value added question and exploit the base product marketing concept. We still tend to slide back to our

older, more comfortable structure rather than redirect our valuable marketing resources. Yet each of us knows that marketing groups must change and evolve, and create new and drop old focii. (The buggy whip analogy).

Can we talk about this at the next WOODS.

1.56

*Division*

I n t e r o f f i c e M e m o

TO: DON GAUBATZ  
MANAGEMENT COMM:  
JOEL SCHWARTZ

DATE: WED 27 APR 1983 9:45 AM DST  
FROM: KEN OLSEN  
DEPT: ADMINISTRATION  
EXT: 223-2301  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A50

MESSAGE ID: 5198151003

SUBJECT: RATIONALIZING THE COMPANY

\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*

We cannot have everyone selling everything, everywhere and expect salesmen and customers to understand. In Europe they begged me to sort things out for them. They said, "Do not make any more products but help us market what we have and give us a party line that separates our products and our market groups." The parting shot at almost each country was, "Stay out of product development and get some marketing for us."

I would like to break the company into three pieces, and I would like to decide this soon so that we can take it into account at the May Woods meeting, and simplify the P&L of each product group.

#### I - MARKETING GROUPS

- a. The OEM group would include TOEM and COEM which are like TOEM's. They would sell 11's and VAX's to OEM's that do not compete with our end user strategies.
- b. End-users would stake out certain applications and certain markets and have a simple straight forward product line that would offer solutions to specific markets. These would be our end user strategies.
- c. Resellers, which would include non-Digital Stores, Distributors, Micro Dealers, and COEM's who are just resellers, competing directly with our end user strategies. We would sell them industry standard products.

#### II - PRODUCTS

- a. OEM group would sell LCP5, LCP8 with Micro VAX and Aztec, and LCP boxes, and 19" racks.
- b. End users still sell everything but the sales thrust and the solutions will be offered on 11's and VAX's and a

## Q-Box.

When we offer our products to OEM's they will have priority higher than our end users (this is one of the reasons for not selling disks to OEM's). We probably will have to give our resellers and OEM's the highest priority for the AZTEC, and make do with whatever we can for the end user. This might mean buying out an 8" Winchester and an 8" streamer tape.

- c. Resellers will sell Rainbows and Crossbows. The Crossbow is a machine that plays Rainbow software, UNIX software, and takes care of multi-user UNIX, and maybe multi-user CPM, and uses AZTEC disks. Crossbow probably should be on Q-bus.

## III - ENGINEERING

- a. Micro's and products for OEM's will be done in the present group doing the work.
- b. Engineering for the end user will be done in a new group specializing in just those pieces needed for end users solutions.
- c. The Rainbow group will do the engineering for the resellers.

To simplify the decision, I propose, that for this approximation, we do not discuss the status of the Professional, DECmate, Terminals and the full size VAX.

K02:S8.6

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*Strategy Com.*

JUN 16 1983

Interoffice Memo

TO: KEN OLSEN  
JACK SHIELDS  
\*JACK SMITH

DATE: FRI 10 JUN 1983 9:38 AM DST  
FROM: WIN HINDLE  
DEPT: CORPORATE OPERATIONS  
EXT: 223-2338  
LOC/MAIL STOP: ML10-2/A53

MESSAGE ID: 5202570663

SUBJECT: DIVISIONS - SOME THOUGHTS

R E S T R I C T E D   D I S T R I B U T I O N

1. Terminals

Objective: Sell all the IBM ports.

Terminals Division Manager - Hanson, Esten, ? *Puffer -*

Marketing - Art Campbell

Engineering - Bill Avery

Manufacturing - ?

Comments: Easy to do.

2. Resellers

Objective: Get all the industry standard personal computer business.

Division Manager - Jim Cudmore

Marketing - Joel Schwartz

Engineering - Barry James Folsom

Manufacturing - Paul McGaunn

Comments: Engineering Group must design industry standard personal computers for sale direct to end-users as well as for sale through resellers.

3. Business and Office Systems Division

Objective: Get Significant market share:

a) in office systems.

b) in business systems for small and medium sized companies.

*Win  
Where would you  
see Bob Puffer?  
Smith*

Division Manager - ?

Office Marketing - Henry Ancona

Business Marketing - Bob Hughes

Engineering - Julius Marcus

No Manufacturing

Comments: An alternative would be two separate divisions, one for office and one for business, but then we would have to split engineering. The advantage in a division is that we will have one plan that is integrated and one person responsible. It may be possible for us to have one plan without creating a division. The June WOODS should be a good indication of whether this is happening.

#### 4. OEM Division

Objective: Stay number one in the computer OEM business.

Division Manager - Ward MacKenzie

Marketing - Jack MacKeen

Engineering - Mike Gutman

No Manufacturing.

Comments: VAX will become more and more important to the OEM business, but will not be part of the Division.

My Summary: Do 1 and 2 soon, hold on others while we learn how to do it well.

WH:dc

WH1:S4.37

10-JUN-83 12:39:00 S 03443 CORE  
CORE MESSAGE ID: 5202524415

*Win - Bill asked for some thoughts for the division discussions & thought you might be interested in*

|d|i|g|i|t|a|l|

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

SEP 21 1983

*Dave*  
*Divinno*  
*Dave*

TO: Bill Steul

DATE: 9/21/83 Wed 14:14:22

CC: Al Bertocchi  
Win Hindle

FROM: Dave Packer

DEPT: Corp. Financial Plng. & Analysis

EXTN: 223-7487

LOC: MSO/L16

SUBJECT: DIVISION COMMENTS

Here, as you requested, are a set of comments relating to our "divisionalization." They reflect my biases.

GOALS

- o Main goal is to subdivide company into a set of business entities that can be viewed separately and for which the top manager can feel he is responsible for overall performance.
- o Then business entities should focus on non-overlapping areas of major strategic significance to our future, broadly enough defined to encourage innovation and adaptation to technological or market change (Transportation business vs Railroad business).
- o Each entity should be measurable by basic measures, be as independent as possible (but not necessarily totally independent) and directly manage as many resources as makes sense (but certainly not all resources).

PRIMARY UNITS

- o Without going into detail, I think most or all divisions should be market based - Ward's list is probably close to right and is also in tune with our historic development. Several specifics:
  - OEM should be a division, serving this significant customer base with a unique cost structure, etc.
  - Reseller and distributor probably should be a division, but this is more questionable for non-value added channels. Needs discussion!
  - Customer services should be a division - it is so cohesive and strong that dividing just doesn't seem reasonable now. However, we must be able to understand its profit contribution to other markets for proper goal setting of market-oriented divisions.



## CONTENT OF DIVISIONS/CORPORATION

o Division content should, initially, consist of the following:

- Division Management
- Marketing
- Direct Advertising & Sales Promotion
- Market-driven engineering  
Engineering activities primarily driven by customer wants and needs, unique and vital to capturing the market. Specifics: Applications software, unique hardware
- Manufacturing unique to the division (if any)

Initially some divisions may have no engineering or manufacturing, but we would expect movement in this direction over time.

o Engineering, particularly, should be given to Divisions wherever possible.

Divisions would contract with Corporate functions to provide shared resources.

o Corporate Content

- Corporate Management
- Research and Engineering, technology-driven R&D
- Field Operations - Geographic management
- Sales function, contracted out to divisions (Volumes/Cost)
- Manufacturing; Worldwide, low cost, high quality producer
- Corporate Advertising; Image advertising, initially reviews and coordinates to Division campaigns

o General. I think it's most important to have a clear concept that says "We want to split things up so as to have a clear set of self-motivated businesses, with an increasing amount of direct control over time, and to retain vital coordination activities where critical." Set up a spirit where people's creativity is focused on making this happen, and we might be surprised how much change occurs.

o Create an environment where functions will be motivated to align with divisions wherever possible.

## SIZE

o My bias (stemming from living through DEC's growth) is that 300-500M is the right maximum size. The trade off here is size vs too narrow segmentation. I assume we would end up with a variety of sizes, and get some experience about the trade offs.

## RESPONSIBILITIES

- o Basic concept must be that Divisions have complete business responsibility. A little compromise on this probably hurts a whole lot.
- o I think this should encompass both short term "tactical" and long term "strategic." (The split just won't work, and certainly isn't like "running your own company.")
- o Functions have complete goal congruence, and are measured on their achievement of plan, which is the sum of division plans.
- o Order administration, credit and collections, short-term manufacturing interface remains with field -- customer-account focus.
- o This looks a lot like the Consumer Product Management function, so we know it can work well!

## PLANNING PROCESSES

- o Given that Field, much Engineering, and much Manufacturing remains functional, need planning process to tie everything together.
- o Basic planning process should singlemindedly focus on division plans to capture markets and with strategies necessary to do so. Top management focuses on proposed Division strategies and plans, and makes major resource allocation decisions from this perspective.
- o Output is marching orders for functions. Given a smaller number of Divisions, this is doable, although in early stages functional/Division interface processes will be difficult.
- o Technology-driven engineering might be only other focus, since by definition this is a separable item. (From Divisions point of view this is like basic R&D.) Maybe a separate process - Divisions plan based on known 3-5 year Product Strategies; the R&D plan focuses on 5-10 year strategies. (This interface is the most difficult to reconcile with independent divisions).

## MEASUREMENT

- o Divisions are measured on all aspects of overall business performance, centering on:
  - Achievement of Strategic objectives
  - Market Share
  - ROA

- o Goal Setting incorporates impact of Service profitability; while maintaining Service as a division, we must be able to understand its impact on other market-oriented divisions so that
  - the right profit/ROA goals can be set
  - meaningful competitive comparisons can be done
- o Division measurement focus should encourage and reward longer term (2-5 year) performance and somehow strongly encourage "strategic" results.
- o Functional measurement focus is on meeting goals, productivity, quality, and effectiveness.

GOALS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION

1. COMPATIBILITY

MAINTAIN EXISTING CUSTOMERS

RECEIVE FEEDBACK FROM USERS

UNDERSTAND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN:

COMPATIBILITY - (INTERCONNECT, NETWORKS, AND O/S)

AND

TIME TO MARKET

GOALS OF NEW ORGANIZATION

2. RISK TAKING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

ENCOURAGE RADICAL NEW PRODUCT AND MARKET SOLUTIONS

HAVE ONE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERY INVESTMENT

RESPONSIBILITY AND ROI GO TOGETHER

BUSINESS PLANS AS MEASUREMENTS

GOALS OF NEW ORGANIZATION

3. PRODUCT AND MARKET FOCUS

PRODUCT AND MARKET FOCUS EQUALLY IMPORTANT

BUSINESS PLAN FOR EACH DIMENSION

PRODUCTS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR BY ULTIMATE USE REGARDLESS OF  
CHANNEL

LONG TERM GOALS - - NINE DIVISIONS (DIVISION = BUSINESS PLAN)

FIVE PRODUCT DIVISIONS

O TWO SYSTEMS DIVISIONS (TOTALING 100%) (INCLUDES MARKETING)

LARGE SYSTEMS

SMALL SYSTEMS

O THREE COMPONENTS DIVISIONS (INCLUDES MANUFACTURING)

STORAGE

SEMICONDUCTORS

TERMINALS

FOUR MARKET DIVISIONS (TOTALING 100%) (INCLUDES APPLICATIONS  
ENGINEERING)

O CAD/CAM

O EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

O SMALL BUSINESS AND INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL

O COMMERCIAL

DATA PROCESSING, WORD PROCESSING,

TRANSACTION PROCESSING, OFFICE AUTOMATION

THE FIELD

1. MARKET AND PRODUCT DIVISIONS DO NOT INCLUDE FIELD OPERATIONS

2. FIELD SHOULD MANAGE -

OEM CHANNEL MARKETING

INDUSTRY MARKETING (INCLUDING GOVERNMENT DIVISION)

SERVICE BUREAU MARKETING

DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS MARKETING (INCLUDING RESELLERS)



NON ALIGNED FUNCTIONS

1. IMPORTANT BUT HARD TO QUANTIFY BUSINESS PLAN

ENGINEERING - NETWORKS

CLUSTERING

SYSTEMS SOFTWARE

INTERCONNECT

MARKETING - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNICATIONS

2. ORGANIZE WITH MOST RELEVANT DIVISIONS (I.E. CLUSTERING WITH  
LARGE SYSTEMS DIVISION)

GOALS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION

TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY

TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY IS IMPORTANT. CUSTOMERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO MODERNIZE (NETWORKING).

EXISTING CUSTOMERS MUST BE MAINTAINED.

FEEDBACK FROM THE USERS (E.G. DECUS) IS IMPORTANT.

IF THERE IS A TRADE OFF BETWEEN COMPATIBILITY AND TIME TO MARKET, THE BUSINESS PLAN SHOULD PRESENT THE OPTIONS AND A CONSCIOUS DECISION SHOULD BE MADE.

THE MAJORITY OF DEC'S REVENUES WILL CONTINUE TO COME FROM EXISTING CUSTOMERS.

GOALS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION

RISK TAKING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PROPOSE RADICAL NEW SOLUTIONS FOR BOTH PRODUCTS AND MARKETS.

SOMEONE SHOULD WORRY ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT AN INVESTMENT MAKES MONEY. WE MUST GET PEOPLE TO FEEL RESPONSIBLE FOR CERTAIN SECTIONS OF A STRATEGY AND ALSO THE ENTIRE STRATEGY.

RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD RELATE TO ROI. INDIVIDUALS SHOULD "THINK OF THE COMPANY". THERE SHOULD BE A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS IF PEOPLE HAVE CONTROL OVER A SITUATION.

CORPORATE, INSTEAD OF FUNCTIONAL TRADE-OFFS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

WHOEVER PROPOSES THE BUSINESS PLAN SHOULD BE MEASURED ON IT.

GOALS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION

PRODUCT AND MARKET FOCUS

A PRODUCT FOCUS IS IMPORTANT. PRODUCTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF ROI AND IN TERMS OF THE ENTIRE CORPORATION.

A PRODUCT FOCUS IS EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT AS A MARKET FOCUS. EACH SHOULD ADD UP TO 100%. THE END USE OF THE PRODUCTS SHOULD BE ACCOUNTED FOR.

DETAIL ON MARKET DIVISIONS

CAD/CAM

MANUFACTURING AND ENGINEERING

PRODUCTION/DESIGN

TECHNICAL (BACK OFFICE)

MAKES MONEY

COMMERCIAL

FRONT OFFICE

OFFICE

ORDER PROCESSING

WORD PROCESSING

TRANSACTIONS

DATA PROCESSING

FINANCE

PERSONNEL

BANKING

COUNTS MONEY

EDUCATION

INSTRUCTION

RESEARCH

SMALL BUSINESS AND INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONALS

'NEW' ACCOUNTS/BUSINESS

DETAIL-PRODUCT DIVISIONS

SYSTEMS

LARGE SYSTEMS

VENUS

NAUTILUS

DEC-20

SMALL SYSTEMS

RAINBOW

DECMATE II

11'S

MICROVAX FAMILY

WORKSTATIONS AND THE PRO

COMPONENTS

STORAGE

DISKS

TAPES

MEMORIES

SEMICONDUCTORS

CHIPS

TERMINALS

LA220 ETC.

SKILLS

DIVISION MANAGERS AS GENERAL MANAGERS

MARKET DIVISIONS SET STRATEGY

THEREFORE

TOTAL CHANNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD

EXPENSES MUST BE MANAGED WITHIN PROFIT PLANS

SLIDES

SIX SUMMARY SLIDES

1-3 GOALS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATIONS

1 TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY

2 RISK TAKING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

3 PRODUCT AND MARKET FOCUSES

4 LONG TERM GOAL--NINE DIVISIONS

5 THE FIELD

6 NON ALIGNED FUNCTIONS

SIX BACKUP SLIDES

1-3 DETAIL ON GOALS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION

1 TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY

2 RISK TAKING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

3 PRODUCT AND MARKET FOCUSES

4 DETAIL-MARKET DIVISIONS

5 DETAIL-PRODUCT DIVISIONS

6 SKILLS