



Oral History of Carol Bartz

Interviewed by:
Doug Fairbairn

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Carol Bartz

Conducted by Software Industry Special Interest Group

Abstract: In a wide-ranging interview, Carol Bartz covers her very unusual career, from a quite dysfunctional beginning, through working her way through college and various initial jobs to entering the computer industry. Speaking her mind, even when it upset executives, she was able to get increasingly responsible marketing and then executive positions. She was an early woman Chair of a computer company (Sun Microsystems) and then the CEO of Autodesk. She redirected the company, changing it from one that was engineering driven to one that responded to various customer opportunities. After leaving Autodesk, she was the CEO of Yahoo, which was a mixed experience. During her long career, she was active in many large company Boards, particularly enjoying the experience with Cisco and the NY Stock Exchange. She has recently invested in and is the Chair of a Cannabis company.

Doug Fairbairn: The date is October 13th, 2021. My name is Doug Fairbairn. I'm here to interview Carol Bartz for the purpose of getting her oral history for the Computer History Museum. This is part of the Software Industry SIG project to conduct oral history interviews of executives with Autodesk. We're delighted to have you, Carol. Thank you very much for taking the time to sit with us and tell us your story.

Carol Bartz: Depends on which story you want to hear. <laughs>

Growing Up

Fairbairn: So, before we started rolling, we were talking about your early childhood, and you had some rather unusual and traumatic and difficult experiences, and so just start, you know, when and where you were born and what your family situation was; we'll start there.

Bartz: Well, I was born in Winona, Minnesota in 1948. My father had only made it through second grade because he was pulled out of school to work on the farm. He was of German descent, and they really didn't care whether their children got educated. They just cared whether they could keep the farm going. So, he couldn't even write his name. My mother was very sick from {the time she was} two years old and just made it through sort of seventh, eighth grade; she was sickly her whole life, but very smart. Much smarter than my father was, but she also had more education. Unfortunately, she died at 28, when I was 8 years old. I

remember a lot about her. Very sweet lady, but because of her past-- she probably had encephalitis. She may have had something like water on her brain, so she fell all the time. In fact, I remember walking across the street with her-- carrying groceries--and she fell, and the oranges went all over the street, and the cars were stopping and I'm running around trying to pick up oranges. That's a very, very distinct memory.

Fairbairn: Quite amazing what makes an impact on us, isn't it?

Bartz: Yeah, because the cars were all around and my mom was on the ground and I'm picking up oranges. But she was a wonderful lady. But she died at 28, and I was 8 years old. My brother was two, and so I turned into the mom.

Fairbairn: Your father was continuing to work on a farm?

Bartz: No. By that time he was working in a feed mill for \$40 a week, and so we lived in a {housing} project, which was actually good, because we were in close contact {with other families}. There were like six of us in a building, six apartments, and many buildings, as a project will be. So, you know, I was supposed to clean, I washed the clothes, I cooked. Well, cooking {was} is like Jell-O and ketchup sandwiches and whatever else I could figure out. Washed the clothes. But my favorite story is I'd invite all my little girlfriends. You know, those days you could run all over.

Fairbairn: Your father was working, and you just had to do the household things.

Bartz: He was working and, you know, the kids were in a project. They just ran wild, like everybody did back then, and so my plan for cleaning the house was each of my girlfriends got a room and they could bring their little dolls, but their job was to clean the room. So they were supposed to sweep and dust and do all that stuff, and that's how I cleaned the house. Well, that's how they cleaned the house, I guess.

Fairbairn: That was your first management experience.

Bartz: My first management experience, and they had fun and I had fun and got the job done. So when I was 12, my mom's mother, my grandma, came and said, "Why don't you come live with us in Wisconsin?" and we did, and all of a sudden, I had somebody washing the clothes and cooking and, I mean, it was like I could be a real kid. My grandma's a strong German, so she didn't let me off the hook, but she was a very special woman. Lived to 98.

Fairbairn: Wow. Did she emphasize education for you? Did she have plans for you?

Bartz: Ah, no. Actually, it was the opposite. I got straight A's. She was very proud of that, but she didn't want me to go to college because I was working in a bank making 75 cents an hour, and my church leader, the one that taught my class-- you know, we all had church classes back then-- asked me if I'd work in the bank. I was 15, which was illegal, but nobody'd figure that out; my town was 1,008 people, and he was the mayor of the town and the owner of the bank, so he wanted me to be his secretary as mayor. Well, I don't know if you remember whiteout.

Fairbairn: Oh, yeah. A valuable tool for those of us typing on real typewriters.

Bartz: Well, the letters I would send out for him were 90 percent whiteout. And 10 percent correct. I was terrible on the typewriter, and a terrible speller, which I still am, and I don't even know why he bothered, but then he finally had enough sense to send me over to the bank side and I ran what was called the proof machine. Now I'm into numbers, so now I knew what I was doing, and so I had to run these checks through and make sure they were balanced and all that.

Fairbairn: This is age 15.

Going to College

Bartz: Age 15. And by 16, they let me be a teller. Being a teller back then was having Tilly and Old Marge and every other elderly person, which was probably 20, have me balance their checkbooks and their savings accounts, which, course, was easy for me. They'd come in and give me this and they'd ask for me because I could balance it really easy, and then I finally got to do real teller stuff, and that was a lot of fun. The best news, however, when I was in high school I worked summers and at the end of the day, somehow the authorities figured out that I had been hired at 15 and so a bank examiner, which is what they were called, would come in. We'd close up for the day and then there would be a big knock at the door and they'd run in and say, "Everybody put their hands up; don't touch anything," and then they'd start going through all the records. That's when they discovered I was only 15, so they had to give me back pay, and when I was ready to go to college, I got a check for like \$200, which to me was like, "Oh, my God." So I go off to school with my check for \$200. Luckily, I had a scholarship, so that helped a lot, The president of the bank, the one I worked for, Al, and his wife, had gone to school in Missouri, and they took me down there, and it was like probably March and people were sunbathing, and, I mean, I'm coming from 10 feet of snow, and I said, "Oh, my God, I get to go to school here?" I had no idea what the quality of the school was, and they gave me the first scholarship ever.

Fairbairn: You mean the first scholarship they had given out?

Bartz: Ever. Ever. And because frankly, it was a school where rich girls went to find husbands, and the problem, the big problem with that was I had to work as part of the scholarship, so I had to get up at six in the morning and serve breakfast to my fellow students, and that was really embarrassing, but I got over it, and then I worked in the snack shop, and what I remember most about that was they had ice cream. So, I gained 15 pounds in about a month in my freshman year, because I just kept eating ice cream. But the good news was I took the highest math course I could by the end of my freshman year, and we were aligned with Westminster, which was a boys' school. -

Fairbairn: What was the name of your school?

Bartz: William Woods. And Westminster is where Churchill actually made one of his big speeches. I can't remember how. But they had a computer science class, and you could say that part of it was that I was there with all the boys, but I wasn't-- that's not actually true. I went to take computer science class, and I was programming an IBM 1620, so punch paper tape. Cards first, punch paper tape. Toggling in to get started. But I was fascinated. My first task was, I'll never forget, to add up all the license plates in the state of Missouri, and I thought, "Wow, wow. I mean, can you really do this?" So I then decided to transfer back. There weren't many schools that had computer science as undergrad. I think there were only like three, and Wisconsin was one of them, my home school, and so therefore it was cheaper, and I got some random scholarship for a math student and started computer science there, and-- because back then, if you were a female in school you could be a nurse or a teacher if you wanted to be a professional, and neither of those really appealed to me very much. I always say that if you have a size 11-foot, white shoes look really bad. So, I started along the computer science path.

Fairbairn: Before you get further there, let me back up for a minute. You were raised in rather humble beginnings. Your grandmother wasn't encouraging you to go to school.

Bartz: No, because I was making money at the bank.

Fairbairn: Right. So, what drove you to go to college? Was it the bank president? Was it somebody else in high school? What set your sights on a different path?

Bartz: I would say two people, the bank president, and my English teacher. My town was named Alma, 1,008 people. I think I already said that. Her first job out of college was as an English teacher at our school, and I think she recognized that even though I wasn't a great English student, because I was really into math, physics, that sort of thing, she saw something in me and really encouraged me to go to school, so those were the two people, and Grandma didn't think I could afford it, and she couldn't afford it, because actually for a while we were on welfare, so she just thought I was making a big mistake. And Al gave me a loan and off I went, and she didn't quite buy into it for a couple of years, but then when it was working okay, she

was fine. She just didn't want me to get in trouble with money, and so then, you know, by the end she was really proud, although, I have to tell you, when I went to work for Digital Equipment, she thought I sold watches. And she never got over that.

Fairbairn: Okay. Now, so let's reset. You went off to the University of Wisconsin?

Bartz: After William Woods I did.

Fairbairn: So you were two years in William Woods?

Bartz: Yeah, two years in William Woods, and I'm proud of one thing. My first year, I ran for Student Government. I was treasurer of the student body. The second year I had some other job of the student body, and so the dean said, "You have to stay because you'll be president next year as a junior, and that's never happened before." I said, "Well, that's really nice, but what am I going to do as a senior?" I remember saying that to her, and she was a wonderful woman, and I said, "So I don't see any future here." So she didn't have an answer for that. And so off I went to Wisconsin. So, I went from a small girls' school bigger than my hometown... about 1,050 students. So, that was big, and then to 40,000 students. Finding my way around campus was quite interesting, but I started with computer science and math and statistics and all those things that you do. Although when I got to random numbers, "Is the weather in Russia going to be like the weather someplace?" I thought, "This is bullshit." it was just so nuts that I didn't care, and luckily, with the high-end stat, I was actually very happy because that's when we had the riots and we went to Pass/Fail, because I don't think I would've passed.

Fairbairn: What, statistics?

Bartz: Yeah, not basic statistics. You know, you got two red balls and one white ball and it was this vague, and so luckily-- not luckily, we had the riots, but luckily I got a Pass. I'll never forget that. I was like, "Yes."

Fairbairn: So were there professors that were particularly strong influences on you in that university?

Bartz: Well, yes and no. The professor that was the biggest influence on me was negative. So I must tell you, one of my classmates was William Shockley's son, and of course, at the time I didn't know who the hell William Shockley was, but this kid was very full of himself and seemed to be quite odd. Do you remember the DEC's 2000 cards? We would stick commend cards in his DEC's. You know, "You jerk," other things like that.

Fairbairn: Computer science pranks.

Bartz: Yes. So when he'd print them out, all these comment cards were printed out. We got an assignment over a holiday, and it had to do with Algol. Two different languages to interpret. One had to interpret another, and we were really lost, because we didn't actually start it until after the holidays. So I must explain. My girlfriend was very pretty, and I wasn't bad.

Fairbairn: You were Homecoming queen in high school, right?

Bartz: Yes, I was. Yes, I was. Not only Homecoming queen. I was Queen of the County. That was really a big deal. Yes. That's when my queenship stopped.

Fairbairn: Anyway, back to the computer program.

Bartz: Yes. So one of us kind of lured Shockley away and the other stole his deck. And I'm not going to say which one did what, because that probably was not lawful. But we printed his deck out. Of course, you can't understand somebody else's program. Especially when it's that big, and so we had to go into this guy named Professor Williams and explain our program. Well, we couldn't anymore explain that program, oh, my God. It was just pitiful. So he kept asking her questions, and so we just sat there. It was just embarrassing, and so when you ask me who I remember, I remember Professor Williams.

I don't remember any positive professor, because they were positive, and I didn't need to remember them. But when I went back later to sell them equipment from DEC, most of these people were still around, including Professor Williams, but I had the good sense not to go in and scream at him. So I had a great time at Wisconsin and learned a lot, as you would back then, because it was all so new. You know, a lot of programming and I must say one thing. When you were in computer science, they had-- in the Business School, they taught COBOL, and we were like, "COBOL." I mean, so you could do AI, computing, and graphics, I guess. So that's what you could specialize in. So I did computing, AI. I mean, think of how AI must've been back then.

Fairbairn: It was a completely different path than it's on now.

Bartz: Oh, my God. And so I did computing and graduated in 1970. I took five years. Well, I was way behind, because I hadn't had the underlying courses and maybe I'm going on too much here, but my last year I could take a job of running the computer center at night, to be the operator. You know, you pass your cards in. We had a B5500, and you get your cards back the next day, with your printout.

Fairbairn: With a printout wrapped around it with a rubber band.

Bartz: Yes, and then you go through and try and figure out what happened. So I thought, "All night and that's all I'm doing is watching these printouts come out." So then I had a chance to be a cocktail waitress, and I thought, "That's a really good idea, because it's different. I can make more money, and why not?" So, I'd do my classes during the day and then I'd be a cocktail waitress at night. So that was a nice experience, because I learned a lot about how to manage people. Manage men, to be specific.

Fairbairn: Joined by your customers or the ones that you were actually working with?

Bartz: Oh, no. Madison was the state capital, and this is where mostly congressmen and whatever stayed, because it was a motel. Back then they had motels and-- what were they called? Supper clubs. Something like that. And that's how you get the money, because these guys had money. You would never work in a college place because you'd get nothing. So they had the money and, embarrassingly so, we had to wear Gay Nineties outfits, an era of which I'd had no idea. I went in there. I'd never been in the place before. I went in to interview and the man said, "We don't hire college women. Girls," and I said, "Well, why not?" He said, "Well, they don't know how to handle men. They don't know what drinks are, and they're just immature," and I said, "Well, I'm not immature. I know drinks." I knew beer. "And I know how to handle men." So, I go for my first night and somebody asked me for a brandy and Coke. I go back to the bartender, and I said, "I need a brandy and Coke," he was setting all the drinks up and I said, "Well, which one is it?" So obviously I didn't know drinks, and then the first time somebody asked me for Courvoisier, and I said, "Can you spell that?"

So I was off to a really slow start, but finally through help of the bartender I figured all this out, and finally figured out how to deal with these people and how to get bigger tips. But my favorite story {happened during} was it was state basketball time, and so it was all full of these basketball coaches and all that kind of stuff, and we wore garters and feathers and. So, somebody snapped my garter, which was a no-no, and so I turned around and it was my high school principal. He was so embarrassed. So I said, "Mr. Martsky?" "What are you doing here snapping my garter?" Anyway, that was kind of fun.

Initial Jobs

So I went from that, graduated, and because I had done all this banking work, and I worked at a bank also in Madison. I went to Minneapolis, started working at First National Bank, St. Paul, and they were trying to get into the computer business, and I was the only one that knew anything about computers. I mean, seriously, and so they gave me the ninth federal district, which was five states, North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Now, you have to understand, I was wearing go-go boots, short skirts, and long hair, and I was

supposed to go into North Dakota and convince Tilly in the bank to give me the checks and deposits, courier them back to St. Paul and then the next day courier back the printout. Well, she'd take one look at me... Now, I'd worked in banks, so I knew what I was talking about, but, you know, not very trusting of this whole concept. But the good news is, you always knew who your customer was because it was the brick building in the town.

Fairbairn: So you had to convince them to use the computer?

Bartz: For doing their computer service and automation. So they didn't have to do everything by hand, and so I did that for a while, and then a friend of mine who worked at 3M, which was also in St. Paul, convinced me to go for an interview. I went over there. They also knew nothing about computers. I mean, this, you know, this is early on, and they were doing computer microfilm, and they needed somebody to talk to the customers. So I was attached to salespeople.

Fairbairn: So you went there in 1976? Were you five years doing the bank stuff?

Bartz: Not that long. I don't know when I went there. I'd have to think about that.

Fairbairn: Okay. That's fine.

Bartz: Maybe 1976. So I went along with the salespeople, and then I'd have to install. So I was kind of a systems analyst and a serviceperson for the salesmen, and then I realized they were making all the money and I was doing all the work. You have to hear this story. So I convinced them that I could be a salesperson. So I went off. I was the only one. I'm jumping ahead. I was living in Atlanta. I wanted to go back to St. Paul, because I figured if I went back to headquarters, I could have a variety of jobs, stay there, have a life, get married, all that kind of stuff. I don't know why I was so anxious to get married, because later I wasn't, and so I went up and said, "I want a marketing job, because I worked in the financial sector and I want to do financial marketing," and they basically said, "Well, women don't do marketing." So I said, "I'm out of here," and that's when I got a job at DEC in sales, and to work in sales in DEC you had to either have an engineering degree or computer science degree.

Fairbairn: So did you move to Boston?

Bartz: No. I stayed in Atlanta.

Fairbairn: Atlanta?

Bartz: Let me see. I started in St. Paul, went to Chicago with 3M. Went to Atlanta with 3M, and that's when I quit, because I wanted to go back to St. Paul, and that's when I quit and joined DEC.

Working for DEC

Fairbairn: And how did you find DEC?

Bartz: Actually, a headhunter helped me find DEC, and I got to be a salesman because I had a CS degree. There were only two of us in the country. Two women that qualified for that.

Fairbairn: This is 1983?

Bartz: Maybe, maybe.

Fairbairn: Okay.

Bartz: And so I was a salesperson. Really loved it.

Fairbairn: They had a pretty extensive sales training program, right?

Bartz: Very extensive sales training program. Very well done, and I started out selling. That was when we were leaving teletypes and we were going to the L35, it was a printer, as an interface to a mainframe. So I started out selling that, and so I sold to the phone companies and other computer companies that are long defunct, and I had Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, and Alabama. So I'm driving all over the place and got some really big accounts like South Central Bell and, you know, really did a pretty good job.

And then I decided I wanted to go back to headquarters, because I wanted a variety of jobs. I will never forget this. So the regional manager was in New Jersey, Chuck Shu. So, I flew up, got on the Jersey Turnpike. Never been there in my life. There was a big accident. I barely got there on time, so he's a very pompous man, and so I'm interviewing, and he said, "You know, what I've heard about you is that you're not very aggressive." So I said, "Well, the only thing that's going to make me prove that I'm aggressive is I jump over this desk and grab you by the neck." So, he didn't know what to do. I didn't know what to do. I was so mad. Because if anything, I'm aggressive.

Fairbairn: Right.

Bartz: And that's what I said. I just leaned in, and anyway, he allowed me to move to Boston, and so I went to work in the headquarters doing marketing and all those things you do, and did very well, thank you, and so moved around until I finally got to the OEM group, and DEC was a big OEM company back then. Do you remember that our whole ordering system fell apart and that was such a popular computer that we could not figure out who to ship it to, and so they put me in charge-- by that time I was working for the OEM group, and so I was working for a gentleman who worked for Olsen. So, I was pretty high up, and at that time the men in the staff had never actually imagined a woman could be there, so they gave me all kinds of crap. I wouldn't go on record about what they did, but they decided I should decide who got these 1135s. I'm supposed to decide. So I held these meetings and we put when the order came in. We had these big boards. We worked them every day, and I'm sitting there. I get a call from-- who was the astronaut? Frank somebody who was--

Fairbairn: Frank Borman?

Bartz: Yes. He was running Eastern Airlines at that time. And they were trying to open the Hartsfield airport in Atlanta, and he called me directly and he said, "I understand you're the person that can authorize us to get 1135s, and if you don't, we can't open the Atlanta airport." I'm sitting there going, "I can make the decision to open the Atlanta airport." So I got so mad. I mean, I took care of him. I'll never forget, because I had stacks and stacks and stacks and stacks of paper on who was first and who was second, what was going on, so I took that table and I went, "Shoo," threw it all out into the main room. Papers flying all over the place, all disorganized, and I walked out. I just walked out.

Fairbairn: Because you were so frustrated with the way they were handling it?

Bartz: I was so frustrated with the way they were handling it. I mean, this is a big company, and I'm one person, and I'm supposed to decide whether Frank Borman or somebody from Citibank or whatever was supposed to get a computer. Really? And so I just went, "Shoo." And I walked out, and, of course, everybody's, "Ahh," papers flying all over, and everybody's-- and I-- I walked out, and then they called me and said, "Are you coming back?" I said, "No." Well, then they went into a real tizzy, and I stayed away for like three days, and then they kept calling and calling and calling. I don't know if I ever got a raise or anything out of that. I can't quite remember, and that's not what I was after. I was just after some sanity. So I went back and continued to do that crappy job of deciding... You know, I was in control of all this,

Fairbairn: Did they get the Atlanta airport open?

Bartz: Yes, Atlanta airport opened. Borman was very happy with me, but I can tell you that many other big companies that did not get their computers. Finally, they started getting the order processing fixed, so that they could actually figure out when an order came in and what

should happen, and so I finally got rid of that crappy job, and then went on to work for the VP of sales, and I was in charge of handing out all the quotas for all the salespeople, and they didn't have spreadsheets back then. Everything was by hand, so I had to look at what they had done, what their territory was, all this was by hand, Of course, everybody's calling me and begging me for smaller quotas and so I was in another one of these crappy jobs, Finally, finally, I just left there, and I loved DEC. I mean, I have to say, it was great experience, and, you know, back then, except for IBM, DEC was a star.

Fairbairn: Yeah, DEC was number two, right?

Bartz: It was a star. I mean, minicomputers, you know, all that sort of stuff, and a friend of mine, a very good friend of mine, got a job as president of Sun, and Sun was like three people or something. I mean, it was Andy and Joy and Scott and Vinod, and so he convinced me to move to California. So here in my little brain again I'm going, "Hm. That's where the industry really is. So I better get out there." So that's where, you know, my headquarters concept, right? "I better get out where it's going on," and California. I mean, from here, which was...

Fairbairn: Right. Sunshine.

Working for Sun

Bartz: When you're from Wisconsin, with 10 feet of snow for 10 months a year, I mean, I'm like, "Oranges are growing on trees. This is crazy." So I moved out there, started with Sun, and I started as a marketing manager. A customer marketing manager. I wasn't the big marketing manager, and I wasn't the marketing VP, and then my friend who was president got fired.

Fairbairn: Who was?

Bartz: Owen Brown. And so they did a little coup with Vinod and whatever, and so then they were afraid I was going to leave, and Owen went to Xerox. So I'll never forget. They offered me more money and a Porsche. Well, now I thought I was in hog heaven, so I said, "Man, I am taking that. Of course, Scott and Vinod-- so I went to resign, and they met me at that restaurant where Apple is now, that..."

Fairbairn: Oh. Peppermill.

Bartz: Peppermill. They met me at the Peppermill one night about ten o'clock and said, "We want you to stay at Sun," and I go, "Mmmm..." What was that company? A real famous guy

ran it, but anyway, I said, "No, I have this-- I'm going to get a car and--" you know. So they said, "Well, we'd like you to be--"

Fairbairn: So who offered you the car? Was it Convex?

Bartz: No, Convergent Technologies

Fairbairn: The computer company?

Bartz: Yeah, computer company. But who was the guy that ran it? [It was Al Michaels]

Fairbairn: Is it in Texas?

Bartz: No, no, no, no, no.

Fairbairn: Different one.

Bartz: Somebody local. Anyway, they said, "Well, we want you to be VP of marketing." I said, "But there already is a VP of marketing," and they said, "Well, not anymore," and I thought, "You mean I'm responsible for that guy being fired?" Well, so I took the job. I mean, felt a little bad but not that bad. Took the job of VP of marketing, so I got on staff, and then continued--

Fairbairn: So you stayed at Sun.

Bartz: Yeah.

Fairbairn: And they offered you this job rather than you going off and getting the Porsche. So you never got the Porsche?

Bartz: Never got the Porsche, but I got the VP job. And I really liked Sun, I was probably a little immature in that whole concept, but went back and just rode it out with Sun, and eventually ran all of worldwide sales, all of worldwide operations, president of Sun Federal. I just had a wonderful time. Absolutely wonderful time.

Fairbairn: So how was it at Sun working as a woman? You had trouble or major issues as a women in all these other companies you worked for. Was that different at Sun or not?

Bartz: It was different at Sun. If you could hold your own, be a little bitchy. You know what that means. Yeah, you could hold your own. I have to tell you a story. The senior VP of HR called me in. I was on executive staff, and he said, "You know, I'm going to give you some advice. You've got to stop talking so much at executive staff," and I said, "Why?" He goes, "Because you're always right and we don't want to hear that," and I thought, "That's just the craziest thing I've ever heard of," but he was honest.

Fairbairn: He was serious?

Bartz: He said, "You won't make it here if you don't shut up," and he actually was a friend of mine, but he said, "I just got to tell you." So after that I went to a Palo Alto park and I sat there and thought about it on a bench. I'll never forget that. I thought, "Well, I don't want to lose Sun, so I better listen to this." So I went to my staff meetings. And I didn't say anything. Meeting after meeting after meeting, I didn't say anything. So Scott called me into his office, and he said, "Why aren't you talking at staff?" and I said, "Because Crawford told me I shouldn't." He said, "If you don't talk, I don't know what's going on." I said, "Well, you guys better talk to each other." So he said, "No, you have to talk, because you tell the truth of what's going on." I go, "Oh, my God." So, I got bigger and bigger jobs and really, really liked it. The only thing that got weird is every time Christmas vacation came, and we got like 12 days off or something, Scott would go away and dream up a new organization. He'd bring it back in January and we were supposed to implement it, and, you know, and a lot of times, to be honest, it didn't make much sense, but we had to go down and implement the new organization, and so on and so forth, and we all would sit there and say, "God, if only Scott would have kids and have something to do."

Becoming CEO of Autodesk

But then he got to when he got to when he wanted to have a printer division, and all these different divisions that didn't actually have enough cross-communication, and then it got hard. It got really hard then, and as I say, one dark, rainy night in January, I got a call from a headhunter, would I like to be CEO of Autodesk? And I thought, "Well..." I was kind of sick of hard work, because the margins were so tight. We were always scrambling, and I had run service for a while and Andy Bechtolsheim, all was designing this stuff that was so hard to service because the packaging was so tight you couldn't get the boards out, and so I was always fighting that concept, and I said, "Ah, I'll interview." Make a long story short, I took the job, and so I show up there, not really understanding, knowing facts, and not understanding what it meant, to have all those founders, like 13 founders, no VC money, and total chaos.

Fairbairn: Autodesk is a very unusual company, as I discovered, in terms of how it got started and how it was run, so...

Bartz: Very unusual.

Fairbairn: So who did you interview with?

Bartz: I interviewed with members of the board who were, I would say, somewhat not in agreement, but I got the job.

Fairbairn: Was John Walker still the mover? Was he the chief among many?

Bartz: Yes, but by that time John Walker had moved to Switzerland and made a deal with one of the Cantons on how his taxes would work, because you could do that at that time. You probably still can. I don't know. And so John Walker actually wasn't local. The other guys were, although he had a big influence. You know, I mean, a big hand coming over from Switzerland, and the rest of the founders were very set in their ways, but I didn't quite realize that until I got there.

Fairbairn: What about Al Green, the outgoing CEO?

Bartz: Al Green wasn't very happy, but it wasn't my fault. So, the first day I went to work, we were just going to release 11, I think. And there was this very senior guy, the most senior guy at the table. He had been the next level down from the founders and was sort of running the place. So they were all explaining to me what Version 11 was, and I kept saying, "Well, you told me you have like 160 features, but who are they for? Are they for architects? Are they for engineers? Are they for civil? What are they for?" "Well, they're just 160 new features." I said, "But they got to be for somebody. I mean, how are you going to sell this if you don't know what you're targeting?" Well, that was a new concept, because every two years they'd just come out with another hundred and blah, blah features. That was their whole manner of working. So, I kept asking questions, and this supposedly senior guy wouldn't answer anything. He just sat there, and he was typing away and not taking any responsibility. So we went out for a walk at lunch, and I said, "Your services are no longer needed here," and I said, "So you can go home," and he said, "Well, I have all my stuff up in the room." I said, "We'll get it to you. We don't want to see you again." So, by the time I got to the room, they go, "Well, where is So-and-So?" and I go, "Well, he's gone." Well, then everybody decided they should pay attention. And so that, at least, helped get rid of the laissez faire.

Fairbairn: Do you know why you were hired? What problem were they fixing or what characteristic were they looking for?

Bartz: What they were fixing is they had, for I think 10 years, had this growth, every year this growth, and the had hit a plateau, and they didn't know what to do, and Al Green didn't

know what to do. The founders didn't know what to do, and so they decided they needed a new CEO.

Fairbairn: So the fact you had sales and marketing experience, they felt, was significant?

Bartz: I guess. Because I had come from Sun. I had had so much experience, and I won't tell you who the other two people were, and what irritates me to this day is I found out what money they asked for and it was more than mine and they were big names, but I won't tell you. I didn't find out for a while, but so they just thought they needed a new CEO, somebody who could help them grow.

Fairbairn: These were all male founders, right?

Bartz: Oh, my God, yes.

Fairbairn: Was the fact that you were female good, bad or indifferent?

Bartz: I would say it started out indifferent, went to bad, came back to good. So, everything I did they just watched like hawks, But I brought a couple of them over to my side and a couple I was never going to bring over to my side. It got pretty mean for a while, so I was always balancing, and they would poison the group they were with a little bit. So, I mean, it was a tough situation.

Fairbairn: Yeah, John Walker, even though remote, was known to throw in bombs or whatever, right? So, was that a big problem?

Bartz: That was a big problem, and at one time it got so bad we flew over to see him in Switzerland, and this is my favorite story about my first ride on the Concorde, and I was so excited. We were supposed to land in London. London was fogged in. We had to go to Gatwick. Made it to Switzerland like hours later than we would've if we'd just flown a regular jet plane. But I got to fly the Concorde, and we met up with him and had a kind of a come to Jesus, "You got to stay out of this. I mean, you just can't keep stirring the pot." He was not very happy with that, but he kind of agreed for a while to stay out of the middle, but then he convinced the European VP to secede from Autodesk. So he wanted the code but didn't want anything do with the company. I said, "Who are you kidding?" So we had that fight going on, and then let's back up for just a second. When I got there, I put out a message and said, "Anybody who thinks they work for me, come to the building." Well, like 50 people showed up, and I said, "Well, what do you all do?" Well, we had no HR person. No HR person. So if you wanted a raise, you just convinced somebody, and these poor other schmucks who didn't convince somebody never got a raise. Ever. They didn't know how to fire people. They didn't know how to hire people, and

people just took jobs, and the guy that ran service had a big star like he was a sheriff, and I thought, "Who are you?" and so I had to sort through these 50 people and find out who really should work for me. So, I mean, it was a real total experience in management, and finally got a lot of that settled down, but... So, as soon as the guy tried to secede, I had to fire him, because he was poisoning every well, and he had John Walker under his arm.

We finally got settled down, and the big job, of course, is we were still DOS based, and they were convinced that that's what engineers wanted, and by the way, back then they did. I mean, they didn't really like Windows since it wasn't performing, but I felt that it was the future. So we had the brutal Release 13, which was a huge failure, and part of that was my fault. Because I just kept wanting it to get out and I was trying to listen to the various factions as to whether it was ready or not ready, and we pushed it out too soon, and it was a disaster. So the whole company, I would say, especially the engineers, finally felt some pressure and some sadness that that had happened, so we buckled down and got Release 14 out, which was a big success. So we got Windows going, we got new code in a lot of areas, more graphics, all the things you could do, and then everything was going smoothly and then the internet hit.

Fairbairn: So let me back up. When you first entered Autodesk. it was chaos in terms of organization, chaos in terms of marketing, sort of who are we selling to and what the features are for. Did you sort of develop your own mental plan about how you were going to step through all of these problems or were you just going from fire to fire? How long did it take you to kind of get your feet on the ground – to get the organization, get the strategy, get things in order where you felt you could manage it?

Bartz: Well, the first thing I did is find the simpatico people. The people that realized that the product isn't for everybody, that you really had to have architectural features. You had to have engineering, civil, all the different categories, you had to actually give them something special. I did a big tour of the customers. I'd go to the architects who said, "We don't really like AutoCAD, but we use it, but it's really for the engineers." I'd go to the engineers, and they would say, "I like it, I use it, but it's for the architects." So I knew we had a problem. So we started trying to segment it, which took a while to just figure out how to split these features out and make them really applicable to each market, and there was a lot of fighting about that. So we reorganized the company. We knew AutoCAD still had to be the foundation, but then we had to figure out how to add things on to it that were very specific, and once we had redone the code, that was a lot easier. But we still didn't have the right marketing, we still didn't have the right mentality, because we hadn't reorganized it enough to do that. We would just put a couple people watching over a market, and we realized what we had to do is have AutoCAD as a base, and then we had to really let people put their own structure on top of it. But then we had the problem that they had to go force AutoCAD to do certain things so they could get their job done, and that got us into a little messy time for a while.

Fairbairn: Let me back you up. When you first came into the company, what would you say the core value, what was sort of the most valuable asset that you had to preserve independent of anything else?

Bartz: Well, we were the only company-- well, we're not the only company, but we were the biggest company that allowed people to make their drawings and do the jobs they needed to do automatically, as opposed to by hand, because this whole industry is by hand.

Fairbairn: So which industry? I mean, which was the biggest set of users?

Bartz: Architectural. No doubt about it, because the main features were architectural; but all these other places, all these other disciplines, still needed drawings, and so they would do basic drawings and then they'd have to go on by hand. But architectural was the meat of the company, and maybe partly because that's how they positioned it, and so that was certainly our most popular, without a doubt. But that wasn't going to grow fast enough. I mean, that wasn't enough to really have a company that was going to become important, and that's why I really figured out we had to have specific units to pay attention to a specific market.

Fairbairn: When you first came in, did you have a vision for where the company was going? Did you think, "Boy, we could make this a billion-dollar company," or was it, "Oh, this is an interesting thing. I haven't done this before. Let me see what I can do over here?"

Bartz: It was the latter, and as I told you, I was kind of sick of hardware, and software had big margins, and I thought, "You know, I've done hardware long enough, so let's do software."

Fairbairn: So it wasn't quite too clear where or how, but it looked like an interesting business.

Bartz: Yeah. But it was not well thought out.

Fairbairn: And how long before you realize, "Oh, this can be really big"?

Bartz: Actually, almost at that first meeting, when I realized that. And we had another problem. We brought a new AutoCAD out every two years on the dot, so our stock went, "raar-raar, raar-raar," because they knew it was coming out in two years. So they buy it ahead of the two years, and then they sell off, and then they buy it ahead of the two years. So we had this crazy financial system. I mean, crazy, and our investors were happy and then unhappy. So I knew we had to get off this predictable cycle, and I knew we had to hire people that were of these other disciplines and so they could tell us what they needed, and it took a while, because

every time they tried to make AutoCAD change, there was a big fight. So that's why I wanted to go ahead to the internet.

Fairbairn: Okay.

Bartz: So, the internet comes and the whole company says, "Not for us," because engineers are never, ever going to put their drawings where somebody else can see them and get them. Never. Never. And in fact, I'll never forget the head of Germany said, <impersonates> "Ach, no. Don't even say that word over here. Our customers are going to...blah, blah, blah, blah." So, I brought a team of the senior engineers in and said, "There's a couple things we have to do. We have to put features out every couple months," because that was what was happening. I mean, that's the whole point. So we have to put features out every couple of months to keep this going. We have to change our thinking, and this is our chance to start doing some segmentation, better segmentation, because we don't have to wait two years for something to happen. Well, they just almost threw almost a revolt. "Can't do that. It's impossible. We're not going to do it." I'll never forget that meeting, and so as I was always went to do, I found a couple people who agreed with me and used them to both instruct me as to how to explain this better, and we continued to pull a few people in until finally we got folks that would say, "We can do something every two months," and I just set that as a random schedule, and off we started. We made some mistakes, but basically, we started being less predictable, more modern, more able to service the customers, and finally it got far enough along that we got the Germans and everyone else coming with us. That took easily a year, maybe a little more, and that's when we decided we could actually split the code.

Fairbairn: A year from when you set down that path, which was several years into your tenure there?

Bartz: Right. So we decided we could split the code.

Fairbairn: Between the different application segments?

Bartz: Between the different applications. We actually made divisions with different applications, but the problem was, they had to still go back to the AutoCAD people and get them to do certain things so they could do their stuff, and finally, we managed to get that, that hold, broken.

Fairbairn: When you say the AutoCAD people, this is a core engineering group?

Bartz: Core engineering group, core functionality for the project. We depended on that core functionality, and so there were still things, if you were a mechanical designer, that some

changes had to be made in core AutoCAD. So we had a little to do about that, and finally we reorganized enough to get, you know, AutoCAD people who were assigned to these different disciplines, and that worked better.

Fairbairn: So, which were these disciplines or vertical segments? You said architecture was the primary one going in. What arose after that, and then did others become larger?

Bartz: Well, basic engineering started to become big. If you look at Autodesk now, and I'm certainly not there, but the whole building management. So the modeling of the building, the management of the building, the construction, the moving of information between the various aspects, plumbing, electric, structural, we started, and they are doing now, a great job of automating the building process and moving information around, and I would say-- and, of course, when you think about it, that's kind of a follow-on from, you know, basic architectural back in the beginning of AutoCAD. But they really have done a fantastic job of automating the building process. Now, they're still doing the other disciplines. I call it moving dirt, which is civil, and GIS became a big area for us, and, of course, engineering continued. So all of that's still there and still important, but this, this whole idea is still going on. It's too bad they didn't help with the sinking condo tower in Florida. So that, that has become the Autodesk forte now.

Fairbairn: So you mentioned the internet changed things. So are we talking like mid-1990s?

Bartz: Oh, yes. Right in the beginning. In fact, I have a funny story. I woke up one morning and said to myself, "I thought you slid into irrelevance. We fell into irrelevance." I mean, all of a sudden, one day, we were an old company, old software company, and I'm like, "Oh, my God," and that's when I just had to go on a tear to get this changed. Because most every company but us already had started some program to be internet-based and have information flow differently, and we were sitting there as a dud. I don't think people were too surprised because they never figured out what Autodesk did anyway. I mean, at first, we were in North Bay, so that wasn't cool. We hired different kinds of people than the other software companies hired, because they usually had to come out of some engineering background or architectural background, because otherwise we didn't have time to train them on that. So we were an unusual company anyway that nobody paid too much attention to, at least in the Bay area. Our financial followers paid attention to us, but still not enough, but we managed to grow the company nicely and split the stock and all that sort of stuff, and then we changed our symbol from ACAD to ADSK, and, just tried to get us focused on a broad spectrum of things. But it was frankly when we could start adding features quickly, and not predictably, is when the company broke out.

Fairbairn: What about acquisitions?

Autodesk Acquisitions

Bartz: Oh, we did acquisitions. We did good ones and some really bad ones, which I don't think is that unusual. We did some acquisitions that were good but ahead of us, ahead of our time, and we had a hard time assimilating them. Like we did acquisitions on solid modeling and that kind of thing. We weren't ready for that. It was a good idea, but we weren't ready for that.

Fairbairn: In terms of being able to integrate it technically into the product?

Bartz: Yeah, and then we had this group that there was a gentleman, a big friend of Walker, and they had a special little lab, and it was costing us money and I went to visit, and now I look back, one of the things they were trying to do back in the 1990s, I don't remember when, they were trying to actually put together a buy/sell thing where you would go offer that you could write somebody a paper and sell your service, which is now what happens, but they were doing it too soon and they didn't have the right code.

Fairbairn: This was within the company?

Bartz: Within the company, yes. That was one of their little secret lab things; and I go there and I think, "Well, I see the concept," but we didn't have-- it was way too soon. Way too soon, and they had something else I can't remember, and so finally I just said, "I really like what you're doing, but we've got to shut you down." So, that wasn't very popular with anybody, the Walker crowd, and so I'd find all these things. I mean, they were just scattered all over the place. So it was a constant battle of trying to figure out what was going on, and then, fortunately at the time, but unfortunately, we had a big piece of Pixar. John had bought this big piece of Pixar. We sat there and said, "What are we doing with this?"

Fairbairn: You mean stock. You held a position within the company.

Bartz: Yeah, and a nice one. So we sat there and said, "What do we need this for?" Oh, my God. This is a really dumb idea. Sold it for pennies on the dollar. Jobs comes in. I mean, we could've retired on that. So, I'm telling you all the mistakes we made.

Fairbairn: So the solid modeling was not a good idea.

Bartz: It was later.

Fairbairn: Were you able to keep it long enough to turn it into a good thing?

Bartz: No.

Fairbairn: Did it kind of go away and had to be brought back?

Bartz: Yes, it went away and had to be brought back.

Fairbairn: Okay. So what would you say was the best acquisition, the one that sort of paid dividends immediately or worked out better than you expected?

Bartz: I would say that came after me when they started buying the building concept people. When they started buying building management. We made some graphics acquisitions that were good. I have to say that. Carl Bass, who became CEO after me, had a graphics company, and that was an important acquisition.

Fairbairn: That was several years after you came on board. It was not near-term.

Bartz: It was not a close one, and so Carl came into the company. Very, very bright guy, but also very contrarian. So as we like to joke, I fired him twice, because he just wouldn't play, and then hired him back and then he became CEO. I trained him to be CEO, so that's our kind of joke, that I had to fire him, because sometimes I had to fire him just to get him back in line. So it was a job that never had a day that was the same. Never. Which was part of the fun of it.

Fairbairn: How long did it take before you felt comfortable? You come in in 1992?

Bartz: Yes.

Fairbairn: The product, the organization, everything had to be fixed. How long before you felt, "Okay. Now it's a company. Now it's something I can manage, and we can move on?"

Bartz: Well, all along it felt better and better and better. But by the time we got to, you know, 2000, the early 2000s, I felt we were on a modern path.

Fairbairn: So it took several years.

Bartz: Took several years and every year it got a little better and then you'd backflow a little bit. But, you know, these things aren't like magical, and our stock went fine. But it wasn't what I wanted it to be, what it could be, and then actually, one of the acquisitions I forgot about is we bought a media acquisition in Canada, and they were doing graphics works for "Titanic." I

mean, they were doing all the backgrounds and the fading. One of the actors was Leo DiCaprio and-- what was the lady's name?

Fairbairn: Kate.

Bartz: Kate. So, when they were standing on the hull of the ship, it was really funny, because I go in and watch all this, and they were standing there on just plywood. They're standing there and their hair is blowing, and then we put the ship around them, and we got several Academy awards for that kind of stuff, so it was fun.

Fairbairn: That was a subsidiary; this was the company you bought that did this.

Bartz: Yes. It was called Discreet.

Fairbairn: Where did the ideas to buy that company come from? Did they come from you, did they come from bottoms-up, did they come from the outside?

Bartz: The ideas came from all over. We didn't have a strict hierarchical structure where, "You can only do this, and you can only do that." I really wanted an open door. In fact, I had a great, great HR VP, and so I was so mad one day because we were trying to do some changes, and I said, "You know, this idea of everybody gets to input and then we have to fight with them if they're not accepted. I'm going to change that and we're going to go top-down," and he said, "Well, we could do that, Carol, but then you have to be right all the time." I said, "Oh, shit. That's not going to work." So, I gave that up right away.

Management Style

I thought, "I better just manage the conflicts; the mess is better than me deciding everything, because I wasn't that smart. So I sort of picked and choose who I trusted the most to tell me what was really going on, and I have this philosophy-- I don't think it's a new one-- but two people can collude, three people can't. Because one'll tell on the other. So, all I would do is just keep calling people in on the same story, and then finally I'd figure out what's going on. I never thought you should just believe one person, and that really works in management. That really works.

Fairbairn: Management. Clearly you were walking into a different situation than what you had come from, the kind of companies you had come from, and Autodesk had this very unusual background in terms of how it was formed and managed. Did you adjust your management style at all or how did your style and their style come together?

Bartz: I think you always have to adjust your management style. At DEC, and at Sun, there were definitely people who had managed things before and had their styles, and so I could learn from their styles and then find my style. Autodesk didn't have a style of management. Part of it was because of all the founders. The founders basically were all different enough and, I mean, one guy came in with a cowboy hat every day. I mean, they were just different enough that the company didn't have a style of management, and if I could pat myself on the back for one thing, it's not my technical ability. I certainly have some. It's my management capability, and I'm really proud of that. So I could walk into different situations and, maybe not immediately, figure out who was acting what way and what to do and how to bring them around or get them out, because frankly, it's as important to let people go as it is to keep people. I mean, it's like that gentleman I fired on the first morning. He was going to be a constant pain, because he wanted my job, he was angry and he was going to make a mess in the organization.

Fairbairn: He wanted your job.

Bartz: He wanted my job, and if he'd have just played along, he could've been a very senior person, but he wouldn't play, and he thought he could get away with it, and no.

Fairbairn: So you mentioned the challenges in terms of getting the product onto a reasonable release cycle and then the challenge of moving from DOS to Windows and then moving to internet-based. Are there other such major transitions?

Bartz: Well, the transition we started and then continued after I left, was to really break the juggernaut of AutoCAD, because everything had to go back through AutoCAD, and we broke that juggernaut and used AutoCAD when necessary but not had it be in control of everything. So people could get their own code bases and use what they needed from the product but not have to use the whole product but just some changes, and that was hard but really important.

Fairbairn: Did it take a major restructuring of the code to make that possible?

Bartz: Yes, and it took a restructuring of the thinking, because the AutoCAD people still were there.

Fairbairn: Yeah, I was wondering whether it was a thinking issue or a political or a technical issue.

Bartz: Both. But, of course, the thinking issue holds back the technical issue. So, you know, the folks that were in charge of AutoCAD and were the big guys on campus didn't want to let these things go.

Fairbairn: You mentioned that AutoCAD and Autodesk had this dominant position. What about competitors? Were you ever scared that somebody was going to lap you, you know, was there a serious competitor that came along or was it always an internal battle?

Bartz: Well, it was more an internal battle. Bentley was our biggest competitor. But they were more roadway and civil and so they would get the big contracts with Caltrans and the highways and so forth, which we wanted. I mean, obviously you wanted anything to do with that stuff. So, they were a tough competitor, because they were focused. And so, to get those jobs we had to be very focused. And then you're also dealing with, I mean, I had to go to Sacramento and lobby and meet all these people-- which is not one of my favorite things to do-- to try and get these jobs. And eventually we made it into those markets. But that one was a tough-- because they were really tough competitors. They had a little bit of architecture and some of this other stuff and I don't know where they are now, but they're still alive; they were run by three or four Bentley brothers, so they had the same kind of stuff in a way that we had. They were so incestuous that their mother-- this was a crack-me-up-- their mother actually controlled all of them. So, I thought that is really a problem! I mean, I was the mother of Autodesk, but not the *mother!* So, that was kind of interesting. And then there were a lot of little competitors, and there were a lot of people trying to put standards in that we had to continue to fight. Because if somebody got a standard in that didn't flow with our technology, that's a problem. But it was nothing like you see some of these companies battling out now. Like salesforce management and all that kind of stuff.

Fairbairn: Right. Do you know why that was? I mean, you think that here's a big successful company, somebody would come along and try to take over. Did you just have too much of a lead?

Bartz: Too much of a lead and it was too strange for people. I think they didn't know how to get started. Some of these business applications were easier to understand. We hired different kinds of people. I mean, the people in the company were graduates of these engineering disciplines. So, they actually didn't fit as well in a salesforce. Why would I hire a civil engineer? So, we had kind of the corner on people who really loved making things, digging things, and that was a very big bonus for us. And in a way, at the time I thought it was a disadvantage. But in a way, being up in Marin was an advantage, because once you got them settled up there they weren't going very far.

Fairbairn: And it's true, Autodesk wasn't working in the Valley. Did you ever think about it?

Bartz: Never thought about it. But I used to get so mad at the *Mercury News* because remember when their Business Section was really good. Of course, it's now, what? A quarter of a page, not even that. I knew those people from Sun, and I'd say, "Why won't you cover Autodesk?" And they said, "Well, we don't cover anybody past the bridge." And I would go, "Wait a minute! I get more coverage from *The Boston Business Section* than I do from you!" And they said, "Well, we just don't care." And oh, my god, it used to just drive me crazy!

Back to the Beginning at Autodesk

Fairbairn: I understand completely. I'm sorry, I'm sort of jumping all around, but I'd like to get a little more details on some of these things. As you adjusted-- you figured out who was reporting to you-- you had 50 people thinking they somehow reported to you-- were you able to put together an executive staff from the people there, or did you end up hiring your executive staff mainly from outside?

Bartz: Eventually from outside. In fact, I don't think there was a single person from when I got there that was on executive staff from the original people, from acquisitions, but there were some from acquisitions. I had advisors from the original people that I sanctioned. I mean, made them feel good and they made me feel good, because I could get good information, but they all came from the outside eventually, although not in the beginning. I had to use what I had.

Fairbairn: Right.

Bartz: In fact, I'll tell you kind of a weird story. So, I started my job on a Friday, that's when I kicked that guy out. And I was supposed to have a board meeting on Monday. On Saturday, I was diagnosed with breast cancer. So, I had to go into my board and say, "Guess what? My second day and I have breast cancer." I convinced my surgeon to give me 30 days before I had to announce. And so I had 30 days and I had to hire a CFO and an HR head, because I *had* to get those people in there. So, I hired my HR person about two hours after surgery. I called him and said, you know, "Blah-blah-blah," from the hospital and he joined.

Fairbairn: You had 30 days before you went into surgery, right?

Bartz: Yes, yes, 30 days. And the reason I needed the 30 days was not only to hire those two people, but we had a huge trade show that was very important to us. It was a graphics trade show of some sort. I can't remember the name now.

Fairbairn: SIGGRAPH?

Bartz: Yes, thank you! And I was a speaker; god knows what I spoke about. And so, I had to go to that. Of course, I didn't have to go, but I thought I had to go to that. And then after that, I held a press conference, because back then-- not just back then-- still, if the CEO has a health problem, it has to be public, because you're a public company.

So, I had a press conference and right before that I told the employees-- and you'll probably cut this out here-- but one of the reporters said, "Which breast?" That's how things worked back then. I mean, crazy world! Crazy world! Now I would have just laughed. I don't know what I said. And then the next day I went in the hospital. Flew home and went in the hospital the next morning.

Fairbairn: And how long before you were back at work?

Bartz: Well, I was supposed to not go to work for eight weeks. I went back to work in four weeks. Which now, I'd say was a stupid idea. But then I was younger, and just had a lot to do.

Fairbairn: Were you still living elsewhere?

Bartz: I was living in Atherton.

Fairbairn: For that whole time?

Bartz: I had an hour to a two-hour commute. And that was before cellphones. And I finally got this big hunking car phone.

Fairbairn: The car phones, the ones that were built into the car, right?

Bartz: Yeah, built into the car, and I still call it the Bat-Phone.

Fairbairn: Right.

Bartz: And of course, coming home, I can only call Asia, because of the time difference. I could call the East Coast going to the office. And coming home, I called Asia. So, that was kind of my routine.

Fairbairn: We talked about acquisitions; did you divest any part of the company? Did you shut down some lab stuff?

Bartz: We shut down things. We didn't really sell anything except Pixar and some of these good ideas. But we didn't really divest. We didn't have anything that could be untangled.

Fairbairn: You mentioned the challenge with John Walker. After your visit with him in Switzerland, did he back off? You said he orchestrated this coup or succession.

Bartz: Right, right.

Fairbairn: Did he eventually resign?

Bartz: Did he resign? I don't think he ever really resigned. Some of the other founders were really mad. They just were mad at me and they tried to create a lot of trouble and then finally they resigned. So, by the end, I think I had three or four left.

Fairbairn: How long did it take before you felt, "This is my company."

Bartz: Well, you know, I'd say from the beginning. I didn't know how meddling they might be. And I didn't know how much power they had, and in which group they had power, because they were all doing different things, which was the whole point. You know, they have a great story. They started the company because they wanted to automate the desktop. I think that's pretty well known. And then they found this code that this guy had written in Arizona, I think it was, and it was AutoCAD, but obviously, very young. And they bought that from him; paid royalties to him for a long time. Bought that from him and went into CAD, of all things.

Fairbairn: Yeah, it's a bizarre story. It's like a software cooperative. And yet it worked.

Bartz: Totally, totally bizarre story. And the reason they came together in the first place was they didn't want any management. They had worked in aerospace, they had worked in a lot of places, and they didn't want any management. So, they all came together, nobody managed anything, they just did what they wanted. That's why they had no HR, people just wandered around. So, Al Green was not a threat to them, because things were going so well. They never wanted to talk to investors, they never wanted to talk to anybody, because that was too much like "those bad people." So, Al Green put his suit on, and he talked to these people and he was doing just fine. They could do what they wanted to do. Al did what he wanted to do. And then they hit the wall. And that's when I came in and that's when all of a sudden, my idea of management and their idea of management was just at opposite ends. So, it was a struggle for quite a while. And some of them gave up pretty easily, and others of them just harassed me forever. But I just had to remember that I was CEO, and they were important people, but they weren't running the company. So, it was a bigger challenge than I would have ever imagined.

Growing Autodesk

Fairbairn: The company was very successful financially under your leadership. How big was it when you came in and how big when you left? Do you remember?

Bartz: Yeah, it was like \$270 million when I came in. I believe it was \$1.2 billion when I left. And it was just ready to explode. I mean, we were thinking two billion. And were on our way to that. We could see a pretty good path to that. Starting with that \$270 million, that's when we had to really dig, because that's when they had collapsed. Because they had been on this really nice line. But we never went backwards. But we just had to fight for growth.

Fairbairn: Did you have to struggle to hold your position?

Bartz: Yeah, struggle to hold. Not with other companies, but just our own growth. And too much of this predictability where every two years a new version. And we had to get out of that juggernaut of being so financially predictable that it just didn't help us.

Fairbairn: And it took a couple years to break out of that? To get the release schedules on a reasonable basis?

Bartz: Took long -- until the internet. Because we couldn't get out of that two-year pattern. They just were stuck.

Fairbairn: So, you left in 2006. Therefore, you went through the .com bust. What was it like in 2000/2001/2002? I mean, Sun obviously suffered hugely during that time. What was the impact on Autodesk?

Bartz: Not so much. Partly because we weren't selling used golf balls and ice. Every day there was some kind of newsletter that would come out with all the new companies. And every day I'd read it, and it was usedgolfballs.com.

Fairbairn: In the internet news. Internet.1.0, with everybody jumping in the business.

Bartz: Oh, my god! I'm reading this stuff saying, "What is this crap?" And I knew that we actually had real products, and we could get ourselves into this modern technology, but we still were doing real things that people needed to buy. They needed to buy them. This is other stuff they didn't need to buy. So, we did pretty well.

Fairbairn: Were you on a subscription model?

Bartz: Not then, later. We started a subscription model just as I was leaving. And I stepped down in 2006, but I was Exec Chairman till 2008. And Carl Bass didn't like to travel that much, at least then, and so I did most of the international travel, and spoke to customers, and spoke to the employees. I always made it a habit wherever I went to speak to all the employees.

Board Memberships

Fairbairn: And what caused you to step down? What led you to decide to step down?

Bartz: Yahoo. When Jerry Yang approached me, I realized that I had to focus. See, at that time I was on Cisco's board, Intel's board, NetApp's board. I had just gotten off the New York Stock Exchange board. And so, I realized I could not do these boards and run something new to me. So, Otellini and Chambers were fighting, but I had to stay with Cisco, because I had been there longer. So, I got off everything else, and just stayed with Cisco.

Fairbairn: When did you join the Cisco board?

Bartz: I was on the board for 22 years, and like ten of it as Lead Director.

Fairbairn: From when to when?

Bartz: Well, I got off about three years ago.

Fairbairn: January 2019.

Bartz: That's right. And that was because, frankly, in my mind you shouldn't be a director that long. And you surely shouldn't be a Lead Director that long.

Fairbairn: So, 1997 to 2019, January.

Bartz: Right. And my favorite board was New York Stock Exchange, because that was like walking into La La Land. I just-- I learned a lot. I learned how the East Coast titans worked. They suck the oxygen out of the room. I was on Air Touch board, so I learned a lot on these boards. I never tried to overboard myself, and I always had a rule they had to be local, except I did the Stock Exchange. I never wanted to take four days to go to a board meeting. I thought that was irresponsible.

Fairbairn: So, you were recruited to Yahoo straight out of Autodesk?

Bartz: Being Chairman of Autodesk.

Fairbairn: But that was two years after you stepped down from CEO, what caused you to step down?

Bartz: Carl Bass was ready. I mean, basically, it's like you put a cake in the oven, and when it's ready, you either got to start with a new cake or eat it. And I had groomed Carl and I thought, "You know, Carl's going to be ready to go someplace to be CEO. So, I either have to start over, take another four years to get somebody ready," and he was due the job. I mean, you have to let things go. And he was a different kind of leader, more technical. Different management style, but it was his turn.

Now the board, basically, made me promise to stay as Chair of the Board. Because they weren't sure, and they wanted to make sure I was ready to come back in. Which of course I was never going to do. I knew I would never do that, and I knew he'd be successful.

Fairbairn: Speaking of the board, you must have ended up bringing in a whole new set of board members.

Bartz: There were probably two or three left of the old board. Two for sure, maybe three who had been there.

Fairbairn: From when you first joined.

Bartz: And some of them liked the old way and didn't like the structure and others just moved on. So, I had Otellini for a while. So, we always ended up having a good Intel person on the board, because they committed to that. Because Intel really wanted us to use their chips, to expand our graphics, all that sort of thing. And they were great board members. Then I had a board member, in fact the guy that told me not to talk-- he was in HR, so he was a good addition. So, we really had a nice board.

Fairbairn: Which was the most impactful for you? Or helpful for you?

Bartz: Which person?

Fairbairn: Yeah. Is there one you kind of confided in or one you tested new ideas with before taking them to the rest of the board or whatever?

Bartz: I'd say that was depending on the subject. Yeah, I didn't have one person, but it depended on the subject.

Fairbairn: When you came in as CEO, you were also Chairman?

Bartz: Yes, yes.

Fairbairn: So, when you moved over to Executive Chair, you did the outside stuff while the other gentleman did the inside, and then Jerry Yang called you? How did that go?

Yahoo CEO

Bartz: Well, at first I said, "You got to be kidding?" And that's what I meant, I mean, "You got to be kidding?" "Why would I do that?" and they were in a mess. And I thought, "Here I go. I'm in another mess." What I didn't realize, to be honest, was how bad their code was. They were really code deficient. And almost like Autodesk, it had to be totally refreshed. At the same time, you have to keep selling. And what I didn't also realize is you had that job and then you had advertisers and the public. So, it was two totally separate companies in how you approached them. And that was something I missed. I'd never been in the advertising business. And so, you're dealing with the Head of Proctor & Gamble marketing, blah-blah-blah. And you had to do a lot of work back then. I mean, you see what's going on with Facebook today. You could not put a story of a plane crash next to an ad. You just couldn't do it. And you're seeing that today. And back then you had to pretty much by hand decide where these ads went. And so, you had that, you had who went on the frontpage, because you could charge more if they were on the frontpage. So, you had a lot of non-automation. And then on the technical side, what Yahoo did, they had some of the first of everything. They had the first Neighbors, which was groups. They had the first GEO stuff, but they'd get a release out, and then do the next thing instead of, "Let's release two, three, four, five." They'd get it out just good enough, and they'd move on to their next idea.

Fairbairn: So, when Jerry called you, what did he say needed fixing? Or what did he say they needed? What problem were you going to solve?

Bartz: They needed management. They needed technical management. And Jerry knew he wasn't a CEO. And I had been with him on the Cisco board, so we knew each other.

Fairbairn: Is that the connection?

Bartz: That's the connection. That's the connection. And so, at first, I was like, "Gosh, I don't know. I don't think so." And then over time, over time, I got interested again, I guess.

Fairbairn: There was a challenge there?

Bartz: Yeah, I got to stop getting interested in things. Well, I have, and it was just fascinating. And so, again, I had to change some management out, because there was some older but very, very built-in decision making. The guy that ran the front page, you could not get him to change his mind. I mean, we had to work, and work, and work on that.

Fairbairn: From this management perspective, was it somewhat different, but sort of the same as coming into Autodesk, where there was an entrenched set of people that weren't quite up to the jobs that they had? Or is that a very different situation?

Bartz: Somewhat different. You still had a lot of entrenchment, which I think is with any company. I mean, a lot of entrenchment...there were people who wouldn't recognize what we call tech debt.

Fairbairn: What is a tech debt?

Bartz: A tech debt means you're way behind in your technical practices. So, you had to convince people to go back and work on some of the older things, which, of course, they didn't want to work on. This might sound funny, but Yahoo Finance, of course, is a big product. When I got there, although gold is pretty important in finance, to put the gold price automatically in Yahoo Finance took me two weeks.

Fairbairn: And it wasn't being done automatically when you came in?

Bartz: No, everything was more or less being done by hand. So the products were old, because, again, they had great products they just kept moving on, moving on, moving on. They had the first emojis, they had the first everything, and then they just let somebody else take it away by really focusing on it and doing a better job. We had everything, but we just couldn't catch up with fixing it.

Fairbairn: How confident were you, coming in, that you could fix it, that you could turn it around?

Bartz: I had no idea. Absolutely no idea.

Fairbairn: It was just a challenge, and you were going to tackle it?

Bartz: I mean, I thought I was a good manager, but I had no idea about the ad people, and I had no idea. Because the technical side I knew I could work on, but I didn't get the advertising side. And what had happened was we had let our automated ad server get behind the ad manager, that would manage where ads went, and so forth; we had released one ad

manager in the market, and we were late to get the next one out. And then, in typical fashion, we were going to do the next release. It took three years to get it out, and they kept promising. They promised one year, they promised two years, three years, and by that time, the investors were getting beyond upset. The ad team was just blowing it, and our competition got ahead of us, and it took us a long time. And then finally, good decision or bad decision, we sold it to Microsoft, and had them serve our ads for us, because they were willing to put money into it. Because the problem is that we needed to put in a lot of hardware money.

Fairbairn: You mean for all the servers, everything...just to keep up with the business?

Bartz: Oh my god. It was a crazy investment in that, because we'd gotten behind.

Fairbairn: At that time, you couldn't just buy more from Amazon, or something like that, right?

Bartz: No, not exactly. We had to make a capital investment, we had to make really important hires in software, and since we had started so much earlier, we had to catch up with what the new stuff was. So we were in a very tough situation. Now, we had a billion users, so we were the biggest at that moment. They still have close to that, and that's really based on Yahoo Mail, and Yahoo Mail, they had let that get really stale. But Yahoo Mail, Finance, Sports, and then some of these other random things. But the same problem with Autodesk is they were intertwined; everybody said, "Sell Finance and sell Sports." Well, you couldn't, they were based on the same basic code. And so it was pretty hard with the investors, and the board, I must say, my fault, but I didn't really respect the board. I mean, I had one guy who fell asleep every time at the board meeting. Fell asleep with a little something in his breath. And another guy who never had used a PC. Really? And Carl Icahn, I mean, I took it over right after they had turned down this big offer from Microsoft, and the street was really mad, and they had been voted the worst board in the industry, not just in the industry, period. And so they wanted to just make everything better, which was my job.

Well, their expectations were high, and Carl Icahn was still involved. So Carl would call me twice a day, at least, and he'd call me. I got to know Carl quite well; he basically sleeps during the day and works at night. So he would call me at twelve o'clock at night, and I'd say "Carl, I don't take calls at twelve o'clock at night. I don't take calls past 10:00, so don't call me." So right away, I mean, he and I were at odds. One time I said, "Why in the world did your wife ever marry you?" We had that kind of relationship, and he kept thinking that the minute we would let Microsoft do something, take over ads, that everything would be wonderful. I said "Carl, that's going to take two or three years to work." <mimics Carl mockingly> I don't know if you know Carl, but I said "You've just got to understand this, you're expecting a quick turnaround, and it's not going to happen. I don't know if somebody's not told you this, but it's not going to happen. So you either better understand this or get out of this." So I had Carl on one side yelling at me, the board

wanting everything to be wonderful, and to my fault, I started ignoring the board. Bad thing to do. If I could give advice to any CEO, don't ignore your board. Even if you're gagging, don't ignore your board. But I did, and that's why I got fired. So that, and probably 99 other things, I don't know.

Fairbairn: So when they fired you, were you surprised, happy, relieved, pissed?

Bartz: Well, I don't know if you know how I got fired, but I got fired over the phone. And he was lying, because when I said, "Why am I being fired over the phone?" He said "Well, I'm out in California." Well, he was in an apartment about a mile away, so he lied. So then he said, "There will be someone waiting for you at the St. Regis with papers for you to sign." I thought "Well, I'm not that stupid."

Fairbairn: Where were you?

Bartz: Going into Manhattan. So I went past the St. Regis with my driver, and I looked in, and there's this official guy there. I said, "We're going to the Four Seasons." So we went to a different hotel so they couldn't find me. How stupid am I? They couldn't find me, and they had forgotten to take me off the e-mail, so I sent this message out to all Yahoo employees and said "I've just been fired. I'm really sorry because I wanted to stay here and work with you. You're a great group of people, and I am sorry I can't work with you." Well, they went berserk, because I had gotten that message out. So then they still didn't get that figured out.

They had called a special meeting of management for the next morning, and I dialed into it. So, they were going to go tell the people this, and we're going to tell the people that," and so forth. So I listened to the whole thing, and so I should've said something and just really get them whacked out. And then finally, they had enough sense to cut me off. I don't think they ever knew I was on there, but somebody finally figured it out. So, yeah, that was brutal, that was really brutal. It's hard to have this great career, and then you get fired. I mean, if you get fired at 20, okay, that happens. But to get fired then, especially in this ridiculous situation, that was hard.

Fairbairn: How were you feeling about the company at the time? Obviously, you were struggling with all these challenges, and so forth. Were you feeling like you were on the upswing?

Bartz: We were making progress. I mean, I would never have quit, because I'm not a quitter, but we were definitely making progress. We definitely had good staff. Yeah, I was actually feeling not wildly good, but I was feeling like we knew what we were doing. Obviously, they didn't feel that way, and then they hired a new CEO, and they got a different activist on the board and Carl was gone.

More Discussion of Board Positions

Fairbairn: I'm not going to go through that. Tell me about your notable board positions. You said you learned a lot on the New York Stock Exchange. You spent 22 years at Cisco. What did you learn about yourself? What was good and bad about that experience?

Bartz: Well, it's not just Cisco. So the first thing, AirTouch was the spinoff of Pac Bell Mobile, so it was mobile. So one of my board members asked if I would meet with this older woman in the city, who was the woman on most of these boards.

Fairbairn: Which one of your boards?

Bartz: One of my Autodesk board members. So, of course, I was going to go meet this lady. So we're sitting there having tea, in this old Victorian hotel, and she said, "I am supposed to vet you for a board position, but I want to make sure you understand that you're not to speak for two years." Well, that's not exactly my style, and so I said, "I'm not to speak for two years?" She said "No. You have to go in there, you have to be very subdued, and not really be involved. You just have to sit there." I thought "Is that because I'm a skirt? I mean, what is this?" So somehow, I got around that, and I got put on the AirTouch board. Well, on the AirTouch board was Chuck Schwab, Paul Hazen, the chancellor of Berkeley. Was George on there, George Shultz? I mean, it was also the Transamerica guy that died. So I walked in there, and thought "Whoa, this is pretty interesting," and sat down, and happened to sit next to Chuck Schwab, who is well known as dyslexic. So he had me turn his pages, which I was happy to do, and Arun Sarin was CFO at the time, and so it was fascinating. We went through these deals where we could get Latin America and you always had to go after a market, and then pay for the market. So I learned a lot from them, I just learned how they approached doing different things, and so forth. Then they got bought by the British company, not British Tel, but somebody else, and I didn't want to join that board. They had asked me to do it, but then I'd have to travel to England, and that was against my rules. Because, God, that would've been a week. From then on, I just went back to the BEA, Net Appliance, Cisco, Intel. And I learned from everyone. When you asked me what I learned, I learned from the Sequoia guy, Don Valentine. Don Valentine was on three of these boards, and you learn a lot from Don Valentine, believe me.

Fairbairn: So he's on the Cisco board, and on the?

Bartz: NetApp board. Wow, that man could slit your throat faster than anybody I had ever seen. When I went on Cisco, Sun was a couple billion, and Cisco was like four hundred million. So I was brought on as the big company person, oh my god, my first board meeting, they were talking about service costs, and service percentage of, and Don was saying something, and I was at Sun, so I knew something about all this. I said "That's really a good percentage. I mean, there's nothing wrong with that," and they all went <gasps>. And so we

took a break, and they said, "Nobody has ever contradicted Don." And I said "Well, who the hell's Don?" So, we quickly got all that organized, and I still can't keep my mouth shut if I think something. And so Don and I were <mimics sound of arguing>, but we came to respect each other, more I respected him before he respected me. I had actually told him he ought to think about this Net Appliance thing, because they were going to go public, and I said, "I really think there's something here, Don." He said, "I'll only go if you will be on the board." So I thought "Well, I've made my way here," and so we spent several years on that board, and, in fact, only got off with Yahoo, because I couldn't have all these boards, and learned an awful lot from him, and the rest of the board members. That was a good board to be on. Intel had a different problem, which is they always had their CEO become the chairman of the board, and blah blah blah.

Fairbairn: Quite a succession.

Bartz: We were still in that walk, and so Otellini had just been put in, and the CEO before him?

Fairbairn: Craig Barrett?

Bartz: Craig Barrett was chairman of the board. As an outsider, it became obvious that's an impossible task, because everything Paul wanted to do, Barrett would say no. So it's like "Wait, he's still the CEO. I mean, what is this?" So that was an interesting board, to watch that. New York Stock Exchange was interesting because these titans of industry were-- Fink was on it--I mean, these were big people. Larry Sonsini and I were the only West Coast people, and the only reason they wanted me-- Dick Grasso was after me for a couple years-- is they wanted to try and get Nasdaq people to go on NYSE, because all the tech people were Nasdaq. And so that's why they wanted me, and Larry, was a big name. So, again, in my true nature, I wouldn't keep my mouth shut, and when we got into that fiasco, whether after 9/11, whether Grasso should've gotten a bonus, and all this stuff that happened, I stood up for him on whether he should get his payout. He was old. I mean, he put money into this thing, and he was owed this payout, and they wanted to take it back. I said "You can't take it back. I mean, this is crazy." I said, "We've got to resign, the board ought to resign, not Grasso."

Fairbairn: Probably not a popular position to take?

Bartz: So anyway, that one ended. Yeah, so I got in trouble a lot.

Fairbairn: So, you left Yahoo, did you tell yourself you weren't going to do that again?

Chair of a Cannabis Company Board

Bartz: I did, but then I totally changed my direction; I'm on a cannabis board, and I love it.

Fairbairn: And you're still there?

Bartz: Yeah.

Fairbairn: And is it a public company?

Bartz: No, it was a SPAC [Special Purpose Acquisition Company]. So now I learned, when they first said SPAC, I went "What is a SPAC?" So now I'm learning, I know about all that.

Fairbairn: So you invested, you put an investment in this company, correct?

Bartz: I did, but the financial thing is now we brought three companies together under the SPAC. I was sick of routers, CPUs, software, blah blah blah, so I thought "I want to learn what this is," and it's legal. I was one of these crazy people, I'm not a smoker, I've never smoked anything, including marijuana, never. So that probably put me at a disadvantage. But I went in there, and learned about government regulation, and how this was all happening, and then I learned that the big money, of course, is in flowers, buds, and rolls, and what was up and coming was what I would call health and wellness. And so since I didn't know much about that and I was learning about it, I was really focused. I was interested in health and wellness, which is not only cancer and all that, where you smoke, but salves and that sort of thing. So we've had a lot of management changes, all the classic things, except it is cannabis.

Fairbairn: How did you get connected with them?

Bartz: Well, it turns out that my husband on the golf course knew this man, and his son was the IT person at Clever Leaves. And he said to Bill "Do you guys want to take a tour?" And I said "Oh, I'd love to take a tour, I don't know what they do." I mean, I don't know what any cannabis company does. I didn't even know the word "cannabis;" I thought it was all marijuana. And so we took a tour, at the end of the tour I said "Yeah, I want to make an investment." And they said "Well, who are you?" And so I made an investment, and then they said, when they found out who I was, "Well, do you want to be on the board?" I said "Sure, I'll be on the board." Then they said, "Do you want to be chairman of the board?" I said "Sure, I'll be chairman of the board," which, after the SPAC, which they call "de-spacing", it became a Canadian public company] I'm no longer chairman of the board, thank you. So I learned a lot about it, I really see its value. One of the big problems is regulation from the state, from the counties, from the cities,

from the teachers. I mean, you name it, somebody's got an opinion. So I've learned a lot about trying to do regulated companies, they're not so much fun. But I just like the switch, I just like changing.

Fairbairn: How long have you been associated with the company?

Bartz: Two and a half years, maybe?

Fairbairn: And is Joe Montana also part of this? Is he an investor, or something?

Bartz: He's an investor, and Jay-Z is one of our ambassadors, and we make special products with his name on it. That happens a lot in cannabis, you get one of the rappers. And so Jay-Z's been good for the company, and we got a new board when the SPAC came in, so you have people from all these different companies, and plus the main investors. So that's been interesting. Normally, boards form, and they come on one at a time. All of a sudden, we had a brand new board, and that's been interesting, just trying to figure out the personalities, and who's got what investment in their mind, and so forth. So it's fun, it keeps me going.

Fairbairn: Is the company growing slowly, rapidly?

Bartz: The company is growing medium. It's growing rapidly, but we have a lot of costs, because we're growing rapidly. And we also still have the problem of Humboldt County, because once they found out all the taxes, because it's like 52% tax on all these products, because the county wants them, the city wants them, blah blah blah. So, once Humboldt County came out, they thought "Oh, now we're legal," and then they found out that every product had to be plus 50%. They went back in hiding, and so we have the illegal, if you will. Our product is tested every week by the state, and that's a problem I have with the hemp products. There's no testing on these products, and people are getting kind of sucked into some of this not so good stuff. So I'm just learning a lot, and I'm having fun, and it's different. I'm not a go-on-a-charity-board kind of person, because they don't run very well. When I go on them, I want to run them, because they just talk too much.

Fairbairn: Well, we're going to wrap it up soon, but just touch a little bit on your personal life. You were married when? You have children?

Personal Life

Bartz: I was married thirty-three years ago to a wonderful man, Bill Marr. I have two stepchildren, but they were six and eight, so they're my kids. We have one, a girl, so we have a forty-two-year-old, a forty-year-old, and a thirty-two-year-old. Five grandchildren. So I'm

grandma, and I have a special thing that I do. I have a magic pocket, and in the magic pocket is always some treats. Now, treats could be a little car, it could be a little doll, it could be gummies, but they come up and say, "Is it magic pocket time?" So I love being a gram, yeah.

Fairbairn: They live in the area, or really close by?

Bartz: Three grandchildren live in the area. Our son went on a-- not a sabbatical-- but he worked for Autodesk for three months, came back nineteen years later. Married a British girl.

Fairbairn: Went to Autodesk in Europe, or something?

Bartz: No, no, in Hong Kong. Went to Hong Kong, was supposed to be an intern for three months, and never came back. But he got out just before the mess.

Fairbairn: Handover?

Bartz: No, he got over just a year ago, just before the riots. Just got his family out, and he's living in Woodside. And so I see those three, and the other two grandchildren are in Memphis, and the youngest has none yet.

Fairbairn: Well, she lives here.

Bartz: She lives here. So it's a great life.

Fairbairn: Sounds wonderful.

Bartz: It is.

Fairbairn: What have I missed?

Bartz: Well?

Fairbairn: I know, millions of things. But is there anything you'd particularly like to talk about, or highlight, that we have not covered or that nobody ever asked you about?

Bartz: I'm a pretty big talker. I mean, I don't hold anything back. I don't think you've missed anything. I mean, I could go on for hours just because, you notice, I'm not afraid to say anything. But no, you've certainly got the highlights, certainly.

Fairbairn: Okay, well, it's been a pleasure. Thank you, Carol.

Bartz: You're welcome.

Fairbairn: Appreciate you spending the time.

Bartz: It's fun to be here.